“We are 50-100 years behind advanced countries.
We must make good this distance in ten years.
Either we do this, or we will be crushed..." .
I.V.Stalin
(February 4, 1931 I All-Union Conference of Socialist Industry Workers)

The Great Patriotic War occurred during the elderly years of I.V. Stalin’s life. In 1941 he was 62 years old. Knowing about the impending war against the USSR, J.V. Stalin did everything possible (and even more) to prepare the Soviet Union for this war as much as possible. Thanks to the economic system he created, the economy of the Soviet Union rose to its feet at a gigantic pace. The USSR State Planning Committee played a decisive role in this process.

J.V. Stalin understood that without planning it would be impossible to create any effective economy, therefore, by creating the State Planning Committee of the USSR and building an effective socialist economy, Stalin actually built a super-concern state, which in the post-war years became completely self-sufficient and provided itself with all the necessary products.

On the 131st Birthday of J.V. Stalin, we are bringing to the site material dedicated to the history of the creation of the pre-war economy of the USSR and its role in the Great Patriotic War.

We invite site visitors to independently compare the current state of affairs in the Russian economy with the situation that existed during the reign of I.V. Stalin. Compare the “successes” of the current leaders of Russia with the successes of the Stalinist Government of the USSR. And draw conclusions about the reasons for the so-called. “de-Stalinization” of Russian society, which was recently initiated by President Dmitry Medvedev.

The following material is a revised version of the article "The Great Economy of the Great War", which was published in the magazine "However" (from 05.05.2010, http://odnakoj.ru/exclusive/interline/velikaya_yekonomika_velikoj_vojnx/). Corrections were made to the article due to the fact that in its original version there were omissions, according to which the economy of the USSR developed, AS WELL, BY ITSELF, without the direct participation of J.V. Stalin. We believe that such a situation and attitude towards the activities of the outstanding leader of the USSR I.V. Stalin and towards him personally is unacceptable, therefore, taking responsibility ourselves, we have made appropriate additions to the text of the article in order to correct the injustice committed by the author and not give rise to “kaleidoscopic idiocy ” from readers, the meaning of which can be expressed in the well-known phrase: “... oil has risen in price.”
Dedicated bold The text font is IAS.

Information and analytical service of WFP KPE (IAS KPE)

The Great Economy of the Great War

Despite the terrible losses, the economic system of the USSR created by I.V. Stalin managed to ensure Victory

Direct damage damage caused by the Great Patriotic War to the USSR economy, equaled almost one third of the country's total national wealth, nevertheless, the national economy survived. And not only did it survive. In the pre-war and especially during the war years, the leadership of the USSR, personally I.V. Stalin, made decisive economic decisions, developed and implemented innovative (in many ways unprecedented) approaches to the implementation of set goals and pressing production tasks. It was thanks to such innovative approaches that the basis for the post-war economic and innovative breakthrough of the Soviet Union was formed.

photo "ITAR TASS"

Since its founding in 1924, the head of state, J.V. Stalin, sought to make the Soviet Union a self-sufficient, economically independent country. This approach contributed to the state pursuing an independent foreign and domestic policy and made it possible to negotiate with any partners and on any issues on an equal basis, strengthened defense capability, and increased the material and cultural level of the population. Industrialization played a decisive role in achieving these goals. It was on this that the main efforts were directed in the pre-war years, efforts and resources were spent. At the same time, the leadership of the USSR managed to achieve significant results. So, if in 1928 production of means of production (industry of group “A”) in the USSR accounted for 39,5% gross output of all industry ( GDP), That in 1940 this figure has already reached 61,2% .

We did everything we could

From 1925 to 1938, through the efforts of the Soviet leadership led by Stalin, the whole a number of advanced sectors of the economy that produced technically complex products (including those of defense significance). Old enterprises also received further development (reconstructed and expanded). Their worn-out and outdated material and technical production base was changed. At the same time, it was not just that others were installed in place of some machines. We tried to introduce everything that was most modern and innovative at that time (conveyors, production lines with a minimum number of manual operations), and increased the power supply of production. For example, at the Stalingrad "Barricades" plant, for the first time in the USSR, a conveyor system and the world's first automatic line of modular machines and semi-automatic machines were launched.

Having set themselves the goal of industrial development of the eastern regions of the country and the union republics, the Soviet leadership “replicated” these enterprises, that is, duplicated equipment and attracted some experienced workers (mainly engineering and technical level) to organize and set up production in a new location. At individual civilian enterprises, reserve capacities were created for the production of military products. In these specialized areas and workshops in the pre-war years, workers developed technology and mastered the production of military products.

During the years of the first five-year plans, and especially the pre-war period, Stalin initiated the exploration and industrial development of the gigantic mineral deposits that the country had. At the same time, the extracted resources were not only widely used in production, but also accumulated.

Thanks to the use of the Soviet planned economic system, it was possible, firstly, the most optimal from the point of view of various costs, and secondly, the most profitable from the point of view of achieving results not only locate significant production facilities, but also create entire industrial areas. In 1938-1940 In the USSR State Planning Committee, specialists from this department compiled reviews of the implementation of plans for the economic regions of the Union, plans for the elimination of irrational and excessively long-distance transportation. Regional balances (fuel and energy, material, production capacity, transport) were developed and analyzed, plans were drawn up for the cooperation of supplies on a territorial level, and large regional complex schemes were studied.

Knowing about the coming war, J.V. Stalin understood that without a strong industry, the USSR would not be able to resist the West, whose entire production potential was placed under the unified control of A. Hitler. Setting themselves large-scale goals of transforming the country into an advanced, industrialized power, the state leadership accelerated the transition to a predominantly urbanized way of life (not only in large cities, but also in rural areas, given that more than 65% of the population lived there) with the creation of a modern system of social infrastructure (education, personnel training, healthcare, radio installation, telephone installation, etc.) that meets the requirements of industrially organized labor.

All this allowed the USSR to ensure high rates of economic development in the pre-war years.

In 1940 compared to 1913 gross industrial output ( GDP) was increased by 12 times, electricity production - by 24, oil production - by 3, iron production - by 3.5, steel - by 4.3 times, production of machine tools of all types - by 35 times, including metal-cutting ones - by 32 times.

By June 1941, the country's automobile fleet had grown to 1 million 100 thousand cars.
In 1940 collective farms and state farms to the state 36.4 million tons of grain were delivered. This made it possible not only to fully meet the country’s internal needs, but also to create the necessary reserves. At the same time, grain production was significantly expanded in the east of the country (Urals, Siberia, Far East) and in Kazakhstan.

Thanks to a well-structured economic system, the defense industry grew rapidly. The growth rate of military production during the Second Five-Year Plan was 286%, compared to 120% growth in industrial production as a whole. Average annual growth rate of the defense industry for 1938-1940. amounted to 141.5% instead of 127.3% provided for by the third five-year plan.

As a result, by the beginning of the war, the Soviet Union had become a country capable of producing any type of industrial product available to humanity at that time.

Eastern Industrial District

photo "ITAR TASS"

Stalin's idea of ​​creating an eastern industrial region was driven by several objectives.

• Firstly, manufacturing and high-tech industries sought to bring them as close as possible to sources of raw materials and energy.
  

• Secondly, due to the comprehensive development of new geographical areas of the country, centers of industrial development and bases for further movement to the east were formed.
  

• Third, backup enterprises were built here, and the potential was also formed for the possible deployment of evacuated facilities from territory that could become a theater of military operations or be occupied by enemy troops. At the same time, the maximum removal of economic facilities beyond the radius of action of a potential enemy’s bomber aircraft was also taken into account.

  In the third five-year plan in the eastern regions of the USSR according to plans with 97 enterprises were tripled, including 38 mechanical engineering. In 1938-1941. Eastern Siberia received 3,5% union capital investments, Western Siberia - 4%, Far East - 7.6%. The Urals and Western Siberia took first place in the USSR in the production of aluminum, magnesium, copper, nickel, and zinc; Far East, Eastern Siberia - for the production of rare metals.

  In 1936 only The Ural-Kuznetsk complex gave near 1/3 of iron and steel smelting and rolled products production, 1/4 iron ore mining, almost 1/3 of coal production and about 10% of mechanical engineering products.

  By June 1941, on the territory of the most populated and economically developed part of Siberia, there were more than 3,100 large industrial enterprises, and The Ural energy system was turned into the most powerful in the country.

  In addition to the two railway exits from the Center to the Urals and Siberia, shorter lines were laid through Kazan - Sverdlovsk and through Orenburg - Orsk. A new exit from the Urals to the Trans-Siberian Railway was built: from Sverdlovsk to Kurgan and to Kazakhstan through Troitsk and Orsk.

  The placement of backup enterprises in the east of the country in the third five-year plan, the commissioning of some of them, the creation of construction groundwork for others, as well as the formation of an energy, raw materials, communication and socially developed base allowed Stalin and the leadership of the USSR at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War not only to use data capacity for military production, but also to deploy in these places and put into operation related enterprises relocated from the western regions, thereby expanding and strengthening the economic and military capabilities of the USSR.

  
  

Scale of economic losses

Despite all the measures taken, the creation and development of other industrial regions (in the Saratov and Stalingrad regions alone there were over a thousand industrial enterprises), on the eve of the war the Central, Northwestern and Southwestern industrial regions remained the basis of the country's industry and agricultural production. For example, districts of the Center with a population of 26.4% in the USSR (1939) produced 38,3% gross output of the Union ( GDP).

It was them that the country lost at the beginning of the war.
As a result of the occupation of the USSR (1941-1944), the territory was lost on which 45% of the population lived, 63% of coal was mined, 68% of cast iron, 50% of steel and 60% of aluminum, 38% of grain, 84% of sugar, etc. d.

As a result of hostilities and occupation, 1,710 cities and towns (60% of their total number), over 70 thousand villages and villages, about 32 thousand industrial enterprises were completely or partially destroyed (the invaders destroyed production facilities for smelting 60% of the pre-war volume of steel , 70% of coal production, 40% of oil and gas production, etc.), 65 thousand kilometers of railways, 25 million people lost their homes.

The aggressors caused enormous damage to the agriculture of the Soviet Union. 100 thousand collective and state farms were ruined, 7 million horses, 17 million heads of cattle, 20 million pigs, 27 million heads of sheep and goats were slaughtered or stolen to Germany.

No economy in the world could withstand such losses. How did we manage not only to survive and win, but also to create the preconditions for subsequent unprecedented economic growth?

During the war years

photo RIA Novosti

It should be noted that although I.V. Stalin knew about the approaching war, he never imagined that the war would start so soon. Several years were not enough for the USSR to be fully prepared for war. Therefore, economic mobilization and the transfer of the country's economic life to a military footing were carried out under enemy attacks. In the conditions of negative developments in the operational situation, it was necessary to evacuate a huge amount of equipment, equipment and people, unprecedented in history, to the eastern regions of the country and the Central Asian republics. Only The Ural industrial region hosted about 700 large industrial enterprises.

Huge role The USSR State Planning Committee played a role both in the successful evacuation and the speedy establishment of production, minimizing labor and resource costs for its production, reducing costs, and in the active restoration process that began in 1943.

Based on historical documents of that time, we can confidently say that plants and factories were not taken out into open fields, equipment was not dumped into ravines, and people were not thrown to the mercy of fate.

Accounting in the field of industry was carried out during the war in the form of urgent censuses according to operational programs. For 1941-1945 105 urgent censuses were carried out and results were reported to the government. Thus, the Central Statistical Office of the USSR State Planning Committee conducted a census of industrial enterprises and buildings intended to house evacuated factories, institutions and organizations. In the eastern regions of the country, the location of existing enterprises relative to railway stations, water piers, highways, the number of access roads, the distance to the nearest power plant, the capacity of enterprises for the production of main products, bottlenecks, the number of employees, and the volume of gross output were specified. A relatively detailed description was given of each building and the possibilities for using production space. Based on these data, recommendations, instructions, orders and allocations were given to the people's commissariats, individual objects, local leadership, responsible persons were appointed, and all this was strictly controlled.

In the restoration process, a truly innovative, integrated approach, not used before in any country in the world, was used. The State Planning Committee switched to developing quarterly and especially monthly plans, taking into account the rapidly changing situation at the fronts. Wherein restoration began literally behind the backs of the active army. It took place right up to the front-line areas, which not only contributed to the accelerated revival of the country’s economy and national economy, but was also of great importance for providing the front with everything necessary as quickly and cost-effectively as possible.

Similar Stalinist approaches, namely optimization and innovation, ultimately yielded results, making 1943 a turning point in economic development. This is eloquently evidenced by the data in Table 1.

As can be seen from the table, the revenues of the country's state budget, despite the colossal losses, in 1943 exceeded the revenues of one of the most successful years in Soviet pre-war history, 1940.

The restoration of enterprises was carried out at a pace that continues to amaze foreigners to this day.

A typical example is the Dnieper Metallurgical Plant (Dneprodzerzhinsk). In August 1941, the plant workers and the most valuable equipment were evacuated. Retreating, Nazi troops completely destroyed the plant. After the liberation of Dneprodzerzhinsk in October 1943, restoration work began, and the first steel was issued on November 21, and the first rolled product on December 12, 1943! By the end of 1944, the plant already operated two blast furnaces, five open-hearth furnaces, and three rolling mills.

Despite incredible difficulties, during the war years, Soviet specialists achieved significant success in the field of import substitution, technical solutions, discoveries and innovative approaches to labor organization.

For example, the production of many previously imported medical products was established. A new method for producing high-octane aviation gasoline has been developed. A powerful turbine unit has been created to produce liquid oxygen. New automatic machines have been improved and invented, new alloys and polymers have been produced.

During the restoration of Azovstal, for the first time in world practice, the blast furnace was moved into place without dismantling.

Design solutions for the restoration of destroyed cities and enterprises using lightweight structures and local materials were proposed by the Academy of Architecture. It’s simply impossible to list everything.

They didn’t forget about science. In the hardestIn 1942, the expenses of the USSR Academy of Sciences under state budgetary allocations amounted to 85 million rubles. Such colossal funds at that time spent on the Academy of Sciences were justified, since the scientists did not “cut” the budget and titles with positions, as they do today, but worked conscientiously for the economy of the USSR. In 1943, academic doctoral and postgraduate studies grew to 997 people (418 doctoral students and 579 graduate students).

Scientists and designers came to the workshops.

Vyacheslav Paramonov in his work "Dynamics of industry of the RSFSR in 1941-1945.", in particular, writes: “In June 1941, teams of machine tool builders were sent to enterprises of other departments to help transfer the machine park to mass production of new products. Thus, the Experimental Research Institute of Metal-Cutting Machine Tools designed special equipment for the most labor-intensive operations, for example, a line of 15 machines for processing the hulls of the KV tank. The designers found an original solution to such a problem as productive processing of especially heavy tank parts. At aviation industry factories, design teams were created, attached to those workshops to which the drawings they developed were transferred. As a result, it became possible to conduct ongoing technical consultations, review and simplify the production process, and reduce technological routes for the movement of parts. Special scientific institutes and design departments were created in Tankograd (Ural). ...High-speed design methods were mastered: the designer, technologist, and toolmaker did not work sequentially, as was customary before, but all together, in parallel. The designer’s work ended only with the completion of production preparation, which made it possible to master types of military products within one to three months instead of a year or more in pre-war times.”

Finance and trade

RIA News"

The monetary system demonstrated its viability during the war years. And here integrated approaches were used. For example, long-term construction was ensured, as they say now, with “long-term money.” Loans were provided to evacuated and recovering enterprises on preferential terms. Economic facilities damaged during the war were provided with deferments on pre-war loans. Military costs were partially covered by emissions. With timely financing and strict control over executive discipline, the circulation of goods and money practically did not fail.

Throughout the war, the state managed to maintain fixed prices for essential goods, as well as low tariffs for utilities. Wherein wages were not frozen, but increased. In just a year and a half ( April 1942 - October 1943) its increase was 27%. When calculating money, a differentiated approach was used. For example, in May 1945 year, the average salary of metalworkers in the tank industry was higher than the average for this profession by 25%. Gap between industries with maximum and minimum wages tripled at the end of the war, whereas in the pre-war years it was 85%. Actively a bonus system was used, especially for rationalization and high labor productivity (victory in socialist competition). All this contributed to increasing people’s material interest in the results of their labor. Despite the card system, which operated in all warring countries, money circulation played an important stimulating role in the USSR. There were commercial and cooperative stores, restaurants, and markets where you could buy almost everything. In general the stability of retail prices for basic goods in the USSR during the war has no precedent in world wars.

Among other things, in order to improve the food supply for residents of cities and industrial areas, by the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of November 4, 1942, enterprises and institutions land was allocated to provide workers and employees with plots for individual gardening. The plots were assigned for 5-7 years, and the administration was prohibited from redistributing them during this period. Income received from these plots was not subject to agricultural tax. In 1944, 16.5 million people had individual plots (a total of 1 million 600 thousand hectares).

Another interesting economic indicator during the war was foreign trade.

In moments of heaviest fighting and the absence of major industrial and agricultural areas, the leadership of the USSR managed to establish active trade with foreign countries and reach a surplus foreign trade balance in 1945, while exceeding pre-war indicators (Table 2).

The Soviet Union's most significant foreign trade relations during the war were with the Mongolian People's Republic, Iran, China, Australia, New Zealand, India, Ceylon and some other countries. In 1944-1945, trade agreements were concluded with a number of Eastern European countries, Sweden and Finland. But throughout almost the entire war, the USSR had especially large and determining foreign economic relations with the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition.

In this regard, special mention should be made of the so-called Lend-Lease (the system in place during the war for the United States to loan or lease equipment, ammunition, strategic raw materials, food, and various goods and services to its allies). Supplies to the USSR were also carried out by Great Britain. However, these relations were by no means based on a disinterested allied basis. In the form of reverse Lend-Lease, the Soviet Union sent to the United States 300 thousand tons of chrome ore, 32 thousand tons of manganese ore, a large amount of platinum, gold, and timber. To the UK - silver, apatite concentrate, potassium chloride, lumber, flax, cotton, furs and much more. Here is how US Secretary of Commerce John Jones assesses this relationship: “With deliveries from the USSR, we not only returned our money, but also made a profit, which was far from a frequent occurrence in trade relations regulated by our state.”. American historian J. Herring put it even more specifically: « Lend-Lease was not...the most selfless act in human history. … It was an act of calculated selfishness, and the Americans were always clear about the benefits they could derive from it.”

Post-war recovery

According to the American economist Walt Whitman Rostow, the period in the history of Soviet society from 1929 to 1950 can be defined as the stage of achieving technological maturity, the movement towards a state when it “successfully and fully” applied a new technology for that time to the bulk of its resources.

Indeed, after the war, the Soviet Union developed at a pace unprecedented for a devastated and bloodless country. Thanks to the state system created by Stalin, many organizational, technological and innovative foundations made during the Second World War found their further development.

For example, the war greatly contributed to the accelerated development of new processing capacities in the natural resource base of the eastern regions of the country. There, thanks to the evacuation and the subsequent creation of branches, advanced academic science developed in the form of academic campuses and Siberian scientific centers.

At the final stage of the war and in the post-war period, the Soviet Union, for the first time in the world, began to implement long-term scientific and technological development programs, which provided for the concentration of national forces and assets in the most promising areas. The long-term plan for fundamental scientific research and development in a number of its areas, approved in the early 50s by the country's leadership, looked decades ahead, setting goals for Soviet science that seemed simply fantastic at that time. Largely thanks to these plans, already in the 1960s, the development of the Spiral reusable aerospace system project began. And on November 15, 1988, the Buran spacecraft made its first and, unfortunately, only flight. The flight took place without a crew, in fully automatic mode using an on-board computer and on-board software. The United States was able to make such a flight only in April of this year. As they say, not even 22 years have passed.

According to the UN, by the end of the 1950s, the USSR was already ahead of Italy in terms of labor productivity and reaching the level of Great Britain. During that period, the Soviet Union developed at the fastest pace in the world, surpassing even the growth dynamics of modern China. His annual growth rates at that time were 9-10%, five times the US growth rate.

In 1946, the industry of the USSR reached the pre-war level (1940), in 1948 it exceeded it by 18%, and in 1950 - by 73%..

Unclaimed experience

At the present stage, according to RAS estimates, 82% of the value of Russian GDP is natural rent, 12% - depreciation of industrial enterprises created in Soviet times, and only 6 % - directly productive labor. Consequently, 94% of domestic income is generated from natural resources and eating away the previous heritage.

At the same time, according to some data, India, with its staggering poverty, earns about $40 billion a year from computer software products - five times more than Russia from the sale of its most high-tech products - weapons (in 2009 to the Russian Federation through " Rosoboronexport sold military products worth $7.4 billion). The Russian Ministry of Defense, without any hesitation, says that the domestic defense-industrial complex is not able to independently produce individual samples of military equipment and components for them, and therefore it intends to expand the volume of purchases abroad. We are talking, in particular, about the purchase of ships, unmanned aerial vehicles, armor and a number of other materials.

Against the background of war and post-war indicators, these results of reforms and statements that the Soviet economy was inefficient are simply ridiculous. It should be noted that the inefficiency of the USSR economy began to “manifest itself” in the post-Stalin period, during the “thaw” of Khrushchev, when agriculture was undermined and during the “Brezhnev stagnation”, when the partyocracy of the CPSU became clan-like and disposed of the USSR economy as it pleased, without developing it in any way. her, which ultimately resulted in Gorbachev’s “perestroika” and Yeltsin’s “democratization.” Those. It was not the economic model as a whole that turned out to be ineffective, but the forms and methods of its modernization and renewal at the new historical stage. Moreover, in 1952, in his last work, “Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR,” which can rightfully be considered Stalin’s testament, I.V. Stalin condemned Marxism and set the task for Soviet scientists to creatively develop it in order to further avoid the mistakes inherent in him. This circumstance allows us to conclude that Stalin was never a “Marxist”. He only used the terminology of “Marxism” because he had no other terminology.

Today, more than ever, the successful experience of our recent past, where there was a place for innovation, organizational creativity and a high level of labor productivity, is relevant, therefore, in order to again raise Russia to such a high level, to make the “modernization breakthrough” that President Dm speaks of .Medvedev, in practice, in all spheres of social life, one must be guided by the knowledge of the COB.

Based on materials from the article by V. Bondar “The Great Economy of the Great War”,
“However” dated May 5, 2010

In the materials of the KOB, the book examines in detail the issue of the creation by I.V. Stalin of a superconcern state - the USSR. We recommend that anyone interested in the life and work of J.V. Stalin refer to this work by the VP of the USSR.

The New Economic Policy (NEP) was launched. The NEP provided some economic freedoms, so almost all retail trade was concentrated in the hands of private traders. But at the same time, as the economy recovered, the government increasingly realized that it needed to take more decisive steps to build up economic potential. This was prompted both by an understanding of the backwardness of capitalist countries in terms of the development of heavy industry (which plays a key role in the hypothetical war envisaged by the Soviet leadership), and by the need to improve people’s well-being. By 1927, two theories of the development of the Soviet economy had emerged - evolutionary and revolutionary.

The evolutionary one provided for a gradual transition from the NEP to the development of industry in line with objective economic laws. Revolutionary theory envisioned a sharp transition to accelerated industrialization, through tougher discipline and the introduction of a rigid planned command-administrative system. Initially, he adhered to the evolutionary concept, but after Trotsky, who supported the revolutionary theory, was removed from the leadership of the party, Stalin sharply changed his mind, and it was decided to adhere to the revolutionary path.

The basis for economic management was state planning and the distribution of all resources by the state. Centralized planning was carried out for periods of five years - five-year plans. The first five-year plan was adopted in 1928 and covered the period 1929-1933. During the first five-year plan, all resources were directed to the development of heavy industry - industrialization. A massive campaign campaign began in the country to mobilize all moral and physical resources to implement the plan. The slogan “five-year plan in four years” was popular. First of all, manufacturing enterprises were built - metallurgical plants in Magnitogorsk, Lipetsk, Norilsk, Novokuznetsk, Chelyabinsk. The energy sector received significant development - new power lines, new power plants were built, and the crown of the development of the electric power industry in the first five-year plan was the DneproHES. Much attention was paid to mechanical engineering - factories were built in Sverdlovsk, Volgograd, Kharkov, Gorky, and Moscow. Thanks to the rapid development of mechanical engineering, by the end of the first five-year plan the USSR completely abandoned the import of tractors. Despite a significant increase in the original plans in 1930, the first five-year plan was completed in 4 years and 3 months and ended at the end of 1932.

The implementation of such grandiose plans required significant material resources. Huge amounts of money were obtained from the collectivization of the countryside and the sale of raw materials to the West, primarily to Germany. In return, Germany supplied machine tools and equipment, engineers and consultants to the Soviet Union.

The second five-year plan began in an atmosphere of general euphoria from the successes of the first, as a result of which the planned indicators, even at the initial stage, turned out to be greatly overestimated and difficult to achieve. The Second Five-Year Plan was mainly intended to complete the creation and modernization of heavy industry begun during the First Five-Year Plan. It was planned to direct significant resources to create heavy industry in Western and Eastern Siberia, Central Asia, and Kazakhstan. During the second five-year plan, the Krivorozhsky and Novotulsky metallurgical plants, the Barnaul cotton mill, the Ural carriage building plant and other enterprises in the manufacturing and engineering industries were built. During the Second Five-Year Plan, significant attention was paid to transport infrastructure: the White Sea-Baltic Canal, the Canal named after. Moscow, the Moscow metro was put into operation. The development of energy continued - the Kemerovo State District Power Plant, Dubrovskaya Thermal Power Plant, etc. were built. It was during the years of the second Five-Year Plan that the widespread use of prison labor became widespread.

The Third Five-Year Plan (1938 - 1942) was aimed at even greater provision for the defense industry. Labor discipline became even stricter; production of low-quality products resulted in prison sentences or execution. By tightening discipline, the Soviet leadership wanted to improve the quality of products, which left much to be desired. By the end of the five-year plan, despite the fact that almost all resources were aimed at ensuring the military power of the USSR during the war, the disadvantages of the administrative-command system, which could not provide further qualitative economic growth, became obvious.

As a result of three pre-war five-year plans, the USSR became one of the leading places in the world in terms of industrial output, having increased coal production, steel production, electricity production and other indicators by several times. By ensuring the development of heavy industry, the Soviet Union managed to provide itself with a margin of safety in the upcoming war, the inevitability of which no one doubted already in the mid-30s. However, the development of heavy industry led to the fact that the population could not be improved, because light industry received virtually no development. Mass repressions and the use of manual labor for the construction of large industrial facilities cost many lives.

The economic miracle of Stalin's » economy
"Stalin's» economics is a fundamentally new model , different from the “market economy”
The essence"Stalin's» economy
"Stalin's» economy The USSR is a huge corporation
"Stalin's» economics: life test
About “distortions” and “mistakes” "Stalin's» economy
About dismantling"Stalin's» economy
About the “human factor” and the “higher goals” on which it depended
"Stalin's» economy...

THE ECONOMIC MIRACLE OF THE “STALIN ECONOMY”

Today we are dominated by “pluralism” of opinions. Some people see some flaws in the Soviet model, and they prefer the “market economy” model. But here's what's surprising: Today, 99.99% of all information classified as “economic” is devoted to “market economics.” The remaining 0.01% of information is related to the Soviet model. But at the same time, in messages, articles and books there is no almost detailed description of this model; everything is limited to pointless “criticism” and the traditional conclusion: this is “ command economy" There are no clear definitions of a “command economy,” except that it is the opposite of a “market economy.”

It seems that the author of this stamp at the dawn of “perestroika” was an economist Gabriel Popov, one of the most zealous “marketers”. The stamp “administrative command economy” is something like a sentence that does not require proof. In fact, the silencing of the topic “Soviet economic model” can be explained very simply: a serious comparative analysis of the two models is extremely disadvantageous for those who promote the ideology of the “market economy.” This is the information and propaganda policy of the Washington Regional Party Committee.

Whatever critics of the Soviet economy say, it turned out to be, in modern terms, more “competitive” than the so-called “market economies” of the West.
But trying to evaluate the Stalinist economy based on the criteria of a “market economy” and the principles of economic liberalism is a futile exercise.

The most dynamic were two periods of Soviet history: the 1930s and 1950s. The first period was industrialization, which was carried out under the conditions of a “mobilization economy.” In terms of the total volume of gross domestic product and industrial production of the USSR in the mid-1930s. came out on top in Europe and on second place in the world, behind only the United States and significantly surpassing Germany, Great Britain, and France. In less than 3 five-year plans, 364 new cities were built in the country, 9 thousand large enterprises were built and put into operation - a colossal figure - 2 enterprises a day!

Although the mobilization economy in the first period of industrialization required austerity in everything and the maximum use of all resources, nevertheless, on the eve of the war the living standard of the people was significantly higher than at the start of the first five-year plan. We all remember the famous saying I.V. Stalin that the USSR lagged behind industrialized countries by 50-100 years, history has allowed 10 years to overcome this lag, otherwise we will be crushed. These words, spoken in February 1931, are surprising in their historical accuracy: the discrepancy was only four months.

The second period is economic development based on the model that was formed after the war with the active participation of I.V. Stalin. By inertia, it continued to function for a number of years after his death (until N.S. Khrushchev’s various “experiments” began). For 1951-1960 The gross domestic product of the USSR increased 2.5 times, with the volume of industrial production more than 3 times, and agricultural production by 60%. If in 1950 the level of industrial production of the USSR was 25% in relation to the USA, then in 1960 it was already 50%. Uncle Sam was very nervous because he was “outright” losing the economic competition to the Soviet Union. The living standard of Soviet people was constantly growing. Although a significantly higher share of GDP was allocated to accumulation (investment) than in the United States and other Western countries.

Thirty years of our history ( from the early 1930s to the early 1960s.) can be called the Soviet “economic miracle”. This should also include the 1940s, the period of war and economic restoration of the USSR. This was not only a military victory over Hitler and the entire Hitler coalition, but also an economic victory. During the period of reconstruction of the country after the war, we were able to return to the pre-war level faster than European countries, and also create a “nuclear shield”, which was vital for the country in the conditions of the “Cold War” declared by the West.

In the 1960s, we began to lose the economic dynamics that were created during the “Stalinist” period. And since the mid-1970s. signs of so-called “stagnation” began to be observed, the loss of internal sources of development, which were camouflaged by the unexpected collapse of petrodollars on our country. Since the mid-1980s. The destruction of the remnants of the economic model that was created during the years of the “economic miracle” began, covered by the slogans of “perestroika.”

STALIN'S ECONOMY - A FUNDAMENTALLY NEW MODEL, DIFFERENT FROM THE “MARKET ECONOMY”

I am not the first to draw attention to the “economic miracle of Stalin.” In explaining it, the authors rightly emphasize that a fundamentally new economic model was created, different from the “market economy” models of the West (capitalist economic model).

The first years of Soviet history were the economy of “war communism” (1917 – 1921). This model obviously has nothing in common with the “market model”. But it cannot be called Soviet either. Some authors, by misunderstanding or deliberately, try to equate the economy of “war communism” with the “economy of Stalin.” If we were to personify the first one, then it should be called economics Lenin – Trotsky.

Elements of the “market economy” model in the USSR took place only during the NEP period: 1921 – 1929. and during the period of “perestroika” M.S. Gorbachev: 1985 – 1991 That is, in its “pure form” it turns out to be about a decade and a half. If we personalize this model, then it can be called economics N. Bukharin – M. Gorbachev. Let me remind you that in the 20s Nikolai Bukharin was considered the main ideologist of the party and advocated for building socialism and communism precisely on the basis of market principles. Later he became an active member of the “new opposition”, which sharply objected to the model proposed by I.V. Stalin and his supporters (“Stalin’s model”).

For about 25 more years there was a period of the so-called “stagnation economy” from 1961 to 1985, when there was no market model yet, but the Soviet model was slowly being undermined from within through various “partial improvements” that did not increase its efficiency, but only discredited it. So that at the end of the existence of the USSR, the “foremen of perestroika” could declare loudly: “the Soviet model is not effective, it must be replaced with a market one.” If we personify the “economy of stagnation”, then it could be called the economy Khrushchev – Brezhnev – Andropov – Chernenko.

Thus, out of the entire 74-year history of the existence of the USSR (from 1917 to 1991), the period of the “economic miracle” accounts for at most three decades. This period is characterized by the fact that at this time I.V. was in power in the country. Stalin. True, in 1953-1960. Stalin was no longer around, but the economy he created continued to function and had not yet undergone any significant changes. Therefore, the thirty-year period 1930-1960. can be called the time of “Stalin’s economy,” and the economic achievements of this period can be called “Stalin’s economic miracle.”

THE ESSENCE OF STALIN'S ECONOMY

The essence of the Soviet model (1930-1960) can be reduced to the following most important features: national ownership of the means of production, the decisive role of the state in the economy, centralized management, directive planning, a single national economic complex, mobilization character, maximum self-sufficiency (especially in that period the socialist camp has not yet appeared), focus primarily on natural (physical) indicators (cost indicators play a supporting role), limited nature of commodity-money relations, accelerated development of the group industries A(production of means of production) in relation to the group industries B(production of consumer goods), a combination of material and moral incentives for labor, the inadmissibility of unearned income and the concentration of excess material wealth in the hands of individual citizens, ensuring the vital needs of all members of society and a steady increase in living standards, the social nature of appropriation, etc.

Particular attention should be paid to planned nature of the economy. After all, critics of the Stalinist model, using the derogatory phrase “administrative command system,” primarily mean national economic planning. Which is the opposite of the so-called “market”, behind which lies an economy oriented towards profit and enrichment. In the Stalinist model we are talking specifically about directive planning, in which the plan has the status of law and is subject to mandatory execution. In contrast to the so-called indicative planning, which after the Second World War was used in Western Europe and Japan and which has the nature of recommendations and guidelines for economic entities ( By the way, directive planning is not unique to the “Stalinist economy.” It still exists today in large corporations. We'll talk about this a little below.). Therefore, if critics of the “Stalinist model” liked the expression “administrative command system,” then they should also zealously criticize the world’s largest transnational corporations, such as IBM, British Petroleum, General Electric or Siemens. There, at the beginning of the 21st century, there is a truly brutal administrative-command system without any admixtures of “democracy” and the participation of workers in management.

In a conversation on January 29, 1941, Stalin pointed out that it was the planned nature of the Soviet national economy that made it possible to ensure the country’s economic independence:

« If we did not have... a planning center that ensured the independence of the national economy, industry would have developed in a completely different way, everything would have started with light industry, and not with heavy industry. We turned the laws of capitalist economy upside down and turned them upside down. We started with heavy industry, not light industry, and we won. Without a planned economy this would have been impossible. After all, how did the development of the capitalist economy proceed? In all countries, business began with light industry. Why not from the iron and steel industry, the oil industry, etc.? Because light industry brought the greatest profits to the capitalists. We started with heavy industry, and this is the basis that we are not an appendage of capitalist farms... The matter of profitability is subordinated to the construction, first of all, of heavy industry, which requires large investments from the state and it is clear that at first it is unprofitable. If, for example, the construction of industry were left to capital, then the flour industry brings the most profit, and then, it seems, toy production. This is where capital would begin to build industry».

As for the accelerated development of group A of industries (production of means of production) in relation to group B of industries (production of consumer goods), this is not just a slogan of the “Great Breakthrough” period of the 1930s. This is an ongoing principle, given that we are not talking about an abstract “socialist economy”. We are talking about the specific economy of the USSR, which was (and in the foreseeable future will be) in a hostile capitalist environment. In an environment that will seek to destroy the Soviet Union by both economic and military methods. Only a high level of development of group A of industries is able to ensure effective confrontation between the USSR and the hostile capitalist environment. Consistent adherence to this principle actually means that the Stalinist model is a model of a mobilization economy. It couldn't be any other way. Stalin absolutely correctly substantiated this by formulating the following geopolitical thesis: the main content of the modern era is the struggle between two socio-economic systems, socialist and capitalist.

It is well known (from the works of the classics of Marxism) that the most important contradiction of capitalism is the contradiction between the social nature of production and the private form of appropriation. So the most important principle of the Stalinist economy is the social nature of appropriation, which eliminates the “eternal” contradiction of capitalism. The principle of distribution according to work is complemented by the principle of social appropriation. Specifically, we are talking about the fact that the surplus product created by common labor is distributed fairly evenly among all members of society through the mechanism of lowering retail prices for consumer goods and services and through the replenishment of public consumption funds.

Focusing primarily on natural (physical) indicators when planning and assessing the results of economic activity is another key principle.Cost indicators, firstly, were quite conditional (especially in the production sector, and not in retail trade). Secondly, they played a supporting role. Moreover, profit was not the most important indicator. The main criterion for efficiency was not an increase in monetary profit, but a reduction in production costs.

STALIN'S ECONOMY AS A HUGE CORPORATION

The Soviet model can be likened to a huge corporation called the "Soviet Union", which consists of separate workshops and production areas that work to create one final product. The final product is not considered a financial result (profit), but a set of specific goods and services that satisfy social and personal needs. Indicators of the social product (and its elements) in value terms serve only as a guideline in the implementation of annual and five-year plans and in assessing the results of plan implementation. Through the division of labor, specialization and well-coordinated cooperation, maximum production efficiency of the entire corporation is achieved. There is no need to say that there can be no competition between workshops and sections. Such competition will only disorganize the work of the entire corporation and generate unjustified costs. Instead of competition, there is cooperation and cooperation within the framework of a common cause. Separate workshops and sections produce raw materials, energy, semi-finished products and components, from which, ultimately, a social product is formed. This common product is then distributed among all participants in production. No distribution or redistribution of the social product occurs at the level of individual workshops and sections, and by definition cannot occur.

All this enormous production, exchange and distribution is controlled by the governing and coordinating bodies of the USSR corporation. This is the government, and a large number of ministries and departments. First of all, line ministries. As the structure of the national economy of the USSR became more complex, their number constantly increased. Within each Union ministry there were also subdivisions called central offices, and various local territorial institutions (primarily ministries in the Union republics). A coordinating and controlling role was played by such bodies as the State Planning Committee of the USSR, the Ministry of Finance of the USSR, the State Bank of the USSR and some others. They also had their own territorial network, including departments with similar names at the level of the union republics.

By the way, a similar organization and management scheme exists in the largest Western corporations (especially transnational ones) associated with the real sector of the economy. There are no market relations within them; there are conditional calculations based on “transfer” (intra-corporate) prices. The key difference between the model of Western corporations and the Stalinist model is that corporations belong to private owners, their activities are focused primarily on financial results (profit), and the financial result is not distributed among employees, but is privatized by the owner of the corporation. True, today this scheme for organizing and managing the activities of a corporation is becoming a thing of the past. For the reason that in the conditions of the current rapid development of the financial sector of the economy, production activities become uncompetitive and even unprofitable. There is a reversal in the activities of corporations traditionally associated with production towards work in financial markets. In such financially oriented corporations, everything works differently.

I would like to note that I have come across a comparison of the “Stalinist economy” with a huge corporation in a number of domestic and foreign authors. Here is a quote from one modern work:

« The USSR was the world's largest corporate economic structure. Corporate economic, economic goals and functions of the state were written in the Constitution. As an economic corporation, the USSR developed and put into operation a scientific system of reasonable internal prices, allowing for the effective use of natural resources in the interests of the national economy. Its peculiarity was, in particular, low prices for fuel, energy and other natural resources compared to world prices... The corporate approach to the economy as an integral organism presupposes the allocation of sufficient funds for investment, defense, army, science, education, and culture. The rejection of the concept of the state - an economic corporation, the destruction of inter-industry and inter-regional ties, the disunity of enterprises, had a catastrophic effect on the post-perestroika economy of Russia» ( Bratishchev I.M., Krasheninnikov S.N.. Russia can become rich! – M.: “Grail”, 1999, p. 15-16).

"STALIN'S ECONOMY": TEST OF LIFE

Stalin's economy has stood the test of time. If you are not a biased opponent or, especially, an enemy of Russia, then you should admit that the Stalinist economy made it possible to: - ensure the overcoming of the country's centuries-old economic backwardness and become, along with the United States, a leading economic power in the world; - create a single national economic complex, What allowed the Soviet Union to become country independent from the world market (what China is now trying to achieve); - defeat the strongest enemy in the Second World War - Hitler's Germany and the countries of the Hitler's coalition; - ensure a steady increase in the welfare of the people based on a consistent reduction in production costs; - show the whole world the inefficiency of the so-called “market” (capitalist) economy and reorient many countries towards the so-called “non-capitalist path of development”; - to ensure the military security of the country by creating nuclear weapons." It seems to me that this is already quite enough to understand in more detail what “ Stalin's economy" Not out of idle curiosity, but based on the fact that today Russia is experiencing a serious economic crisis. And familiarity with the Stalinist economy will allow us to quickly find a way out of today's dead ends.

ABOUT THE “DISTRIBUTIONS” AND “ERRORS” OF THE “STALIN ECONOMY”

Of course, a number of the principles listed above have not been implemented in the actual practice of economic construction in their “pure” form. Partly, due to some conscious “distortions” of I.V.’s political line by some government officials. Stalin, partly due to the weakness of “human nature” (for example, weak performance discipline), partly because I.V. Stalin himself made some adjustments to his political line. Adjustments were made intuitively because there was no good economic theory of the Stalinist model. Stalin tried to intensify the process of developing such a theory in order to systematically improve the economic model. Including writing in 1952 the work “ Economic problems of socialism in the USSR». “Ignorance of theory will destroy us,” Stalin used to say, and these words, unfortunately, turned out to be prophetic.

Without a sound theory, there was an unjustified departure from the Stalinist model and its erosion. Erosion occurs during the period 1960-1985. Individual cases were recorded back in the second half of the 1950s, when Khrushchev began to conduct dangerous economic experiments.

There are many examples of the erosion of the principles of the Stalinist economy. Let us note, in particular, the abolition of such a principle as the primary orientation when planning and assessing the results of economic activity on natural (physical) indicators. The “Kosygin” reform of 1965 began to orient planning bodies and enterprises towards such a basic cost indicator as “shaft” (gross output calculated using the so-called “factory” method). It became possible and profitable to “increase” the “shaft” indicators, while the dynamics of real (natural) indicators lagged significantly behind the “shaft”. The paradox was that the profit orientation made the economy increasingly “costly” and camouflaged serious planning problems.

In a number of ways, Stalin's economics contradicted Marxism. There was no preliminary theoretical understanding and justification of this model. It was created by practice, trial and error. Stalin told his associates: “If you look for answers to all questions from Marx, then you will be lost. We have to work with our heads ourselves.”
By the way, in those years there was not even a textbook on the political economy of socialism. Its preparation dragged on for 30 years, and the first edition was published only after Stalin’s death, in 1954. The textbook turned out to be contradictory; it tried to link the realities of life (Stalinist economics) with Marxism.

ABOUT DISMANTLING THE “STALIN ECONOMY”

A much more serious blow was dealt by the economic reform of 1965-1969, which is personified by the then Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A. Kosygin. Sometimes called reform E. Liberman- named after one of Kosygin’s consultants. The result was a model that some harsh critics call the state capitalist model. Reform 1965-1969 has already turned socialist enterprises into isolated commodity producers focused on profit (the main target indicator), and not on making their contribution to the creation of a common national economic result. The socialist mode of production was replaced by the commodity (state-capitalist) mode of production. After the “Kosygin” reform, no serious attempts at economic improvements were made for almost two decades. Moreover, there were no attempts to cancel the deadly “experiment” Kosygin-Liberman and the economy sank into “stagnation.”

And life urgently dictated the need for real changes in order to strengthen the country. So, in the first half of the 1970s. The USSR achieved military parity with the USA and NATO. Taking this into account, it was possible and necessary to make adjustments to the proportions of development of group A and group B in favor of the second group of industries. It would be necessary to accelerate the development of such industries as light industry, food industry, production of automobiles, furniture, household and electronic equipment, as well as increase the scale of housing construction. Instead, investments were directed to the construction of the BAM, “turning the rivers,” etc. And then a “magic wand” arrived in the form of petrodollars (increase in prices for “black gold” on the world market in 1973). Instead of a policy of bringing up Group B, a policy was taken of eliminating shortages of a number of consumer goods through imports. And since 1985, a period of deliberate destruction of the economy began under the crafty slogan of “perestroika.” A rapid transition began from state capitalism to another model of capitalism, which can be called equally “private property”, “gangster”, “comprador”.

ABOUT THE “HUMAN FACTOR” AND “HIGHER GOALS”

Let's return to the topic of “Stalin's economy”. The effectiveness of its functioning depended not only on how consistently the leaders of the national economy adhered to the principles of the “Stalinist economy” listed above. It depended to an even greater extent on the degree of participation of society and its individual members in the implementation of the plans of the “Stalinist economy.” Stalin understood this perfectly. Therefore, at one time he formulated the triune task of building communism. It included the following tasks:
A) comprehensive development of the productive forces, creation of the material and technical base of communism;
b) improving industrial relations;
V) formation of a “new man”.

The principles of the “Stalinist economy” that we discussed above describe the relations of production that were necessary during that historical period for the country’s advancement towards communism. The task of forming a “new man” was conceptualized by Stalin and his circle much worse than the first two components of the triune task. She was in third place not only in order, but also in priority. And although during the time of Stalin, the activities of the Soviet media, culture, science, and literature were subordinated to the task of forming a “new man”. The trouble was that the understanding of the “new man” was built on the methodological foundation of Marxist materialism. Whatever one may say, in Marxist schemes man turned out to be not an end, but a means. Such a means, which was often called “factor of production”, “labor force”, “labor resource”.

By the mid-1950s. a refined formula of the basic economic law of socialism has appeared, defining the goal of the socialist economy: “about ensuring the well-being and comprehensive development of all members of society through the most complete satisfaction of their constantly growing material and cultural needs, achieved through continuous growth and improvement of socialist production on the basis of scientific and technological progress" Marxism simply could not offer any “higher” (primarily spiritual) goals because it is materialism in its pure form.

It must be said that during the time of Stalin, a lot was done to ensure that a citizen of the Soviet country could fit into the model of the “Stalinist economy” as much as possible. They are talking about allegedly forcibly “shoving” it into this economy. Yes, at first it was. I mean the “voluntary-forced” collectivization of the peasantry. But coercion alone will not get you far. A slave cannot be an efficient worker.

Stalin since the mid-1930s. a course was taken to improve the status of working people in every possible way. Material incentives for labor were supplemented by moral incentives. Socialist competition appeared (as the antithesis of capitalist competition). The country in the 1930s. The Stakhanov movement swept through. Ranks were introduced “Hero of Socialist Labor”, “Honored Worker”, “Honored Worker” and so on. At all levels, educational work was carried out aimed at strengthening labor discipline, a sense of collectivism, mutual assistance, careful attitude towards socialist property, etc. was formed. The fight against parasitism was carried out. By the way, the state’s consistent fight against various manifestations of luxury wealth and illegal income also strengthened people’s faith in social justice, and the state stimulated employment. At the same time, creativity in work was encouraged in every possible way. A movement of innovators and inventors emerged, in which not only engineers, but also millions of ordinary workers participated.

It must be said that Stalin managed to significantly increase the labor activity of Soviet people, and methods of coercion played a subordinate role here. The Soviet people accepted the “Stalinist model” (although not immediately). Because it had a goal in the future, building a fair society, which went beyond the economy and which required protecting the country from external aggression. And after the death of Stalin, who left the Soviet people a “nuclear shield,” the feeling of an external threat began to recede into the background and even the third plan. Economic tasks have come to the fore, stemming from what we mentioned “ basic economic law of socialism" But here’s a paradox: economic goals do not consolidate the people, do not mobilize them, do not reveal their creative potential, but, on the contrary, separate them, weaken them and deprive them of creative creativity, which they are trying to replace with the so-called “entrepreneurship”.

With economic goals, the “Stalinist economy” cannot work; it is doomed to die and be replaced by various variants of the “market economy” model.

Can we return to the “Stalinist economy”? - We can ifLet’s formulate supra-economic, “higher” goals. Such goals are in the air today . Now, perhaps, the most important thing is that someone is able to loudly voice these goals and that they are heard by the people. We not only can, we must return to the “Stalinist economy”. You should not deceive yourself: the “market economy” dooms Russia to death.

V.Yu. Katasonov , prof., doctor of economic sciences, chairman of the Russian Economic Society named after. S.F. Sharapova

http://communitarian.ru/publikacii/ekonomika/o_stalinskoy_ekonomicheskom_chude_i_vysshih_celyah_18012014/

Stalin's economy is the economy of VICTORY.

Stalin's economy: structure and principles.

Stalin's unbuilt economy.

When liberals say that the Stalinist economy was built and within its framework the USSR bought grain from the West, they are lying. Grain began to be purchased only under Khrushchev, who destroyed what Stalin had built.

Therefore, Stalin’s economy is “Terra incognita”. First, the difficult pre-war five-year plans, the relatively short peace before the war. Then terrible destruction and deprivation. Recovery. Annual price reductions. Gold ruble, refusal to trade for the dollar. And then Stalin was poisoned and his economy was destroyed.

The material of retired captain 1st rank, member of the Military Scientific Society of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation, Sevastopol resident Vladimir Leonidovich Khramov, will help us understand what it was like - the Stalinist economy.

Apologetics of economic Stalinism

Dedicated to the Stalinist economic system.

There are more than enough modern teachings about how to do the right thing in those long-gone times. At the same time, it seems to go without saying that some stupid and narrow-minded people took part in making those long-standing decisions. It is also not customary to take into account the fact that those long-standing Soviet managers, led by I.V. Stalin, during the first five-year plans created and implemented a unique “Stalinist economic system”, the effectiveness of which was confirmed by the Great Victory over Nazi Germany and subsequent scientific and industrial achievements of the Soviet people.

The highest competence of Soviet managers is confirmed by the powerful scientific and production potential created under their leadership. The quality and reliability of his main brainchild - Soviet strategic weapons, are to this day the only and reliable guarantee of our state sovereignty. Therefore, for an “introduction to the topic”, a better understanding of the structure of the Soviet Union and the logic of Soviet managerial behavior, it is necessary to realize the presence of a number of features that fundamentally distinguish Russia (USSR) from other states.

ORIGINAL PROBLEMS OF RUSSIA

The entire history of our Motherland is a continuous overlay of negative factors on top of each other, and wherever you look there is not a single bright spot. And the fact that the greatest of states was created on 1/6 of the earth’s land, half of which was in the permafrost zone, and the rest in areas of eternal raids from outside, is a fact quite unnatural...

For these reasons, there have always been two main problems in Russia:

Increased energy consumption of life activity (domestic and industrial human activity) - energy costs for the production of any product or service in our territories are 1.5 - 2 times higher than the corresponding indicators in Western countries only due to the cold climate. At the same time, increased transport and other infrastructure costs caused by our vast distances further increase this ratio.

Chronic lack of human resources necessary for the maintenance and development of social, economic, defense and other infrastructures under the influence of the mentioned negative factors.

It is quite obvious that the conditions for any type of material production in Russia are always initially worse than in the West, and this factor manifested itself with particular force during the development of capitalist relations.

The essence of capitalism is the extraction of profit from the labor of hired workers in the interests of capitalists, owners of the means of production.

The driving force of capitalist production is competition, in which those capitalists who can produce the same product at the lowest cost win. A loss, as a rule, is followed by degradation and loss of production.

Thus, in an open capitalist market, the increased cost of our production, for objective reasons, makes our products uncompetitive and leads to degradation and collapse of the domestic economy.

SOVIET STATE CAPITALISM

Before the First World War, the tsarist government was the first in the world in terms of external debt. Among developed countries, besides Russia, only Japan had external public debt, the size of which was 2.6 times less than Russia’s.

The total public debt of Russia on the eve of the October Revolution was 41.6 billion rubles, including external debt - 14.86 billion rubles.

It is not without reason that one of the first decrees of the Soviet government was the “Decree on the Cancellation of State Loans” of January 21 (February 3), 1918, according to which all internal and external LOANS concluded by previous governments before December 1, 1917 were cancelled.

The socialist model of capitalism operated on the basis of a social form of ownership of the means of production. A prerequisite for the functioning of this economic model was the closure of the domestic market from external competition - by decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR of April 22, 1918, foreign trade was nationalized (a state monopoly was established).

Our production also developed due to profit from the labor of workers hired by the state, and capitalist competition took the form of socialist competition. The difference was that the profit, which we called “profitability,” was used in the interests of the entire society, and losing in social competition no longer meant the destruction of production, but only caused a reduction in bonus payments.

In conditions of high energy costs and a shortage of labor resources, planned state capitalism, as a system of production relations, first of all, solved the problem of optimizing all types of activities to ensure the vital needs of the population and the country's sovereignty.

State planning bodies distributed available material and labor resources, first of all, to accomplish priority tasks.

The priorities were:

Military-industrial complex (weapons and military equipment);

Fuel and energy complex (coal-oil-gas production, electric power industry);

Transport complex (railway, air and water transport);

Social complex (health care, education, housing, vital food and industrial goods).

STALIN'S ECONOMIC SYSTEM

(DOUBLE-CIRCUIT MONEY CIRCULATION MODEL)

In 1930-32 of the last century, as a result of the Credit Reform in the USSR, the “Stalinist economic system” was finally formed, the basis of which was a unique two-circuit model of monetary circulation:

In one of its circuits the circulation of non-cash money (rubles) was carried out;

In the other circuit - cash (rubles).

If we omit individual accounting and banking subtleties, then the essence of the two-circuit system is as follows:

Mandatory, basic conditions for the existence and functioning of the double-circuit model of monetary circulation are:

Absolute inadmissibility of turning (converting) non-cash money into cash;

The most severe state monopoly on foreign trade.

In non-cash rubles, production activity indicators were planned, resources were distributed, and mutual settlements between enterprises and organizations were carried out.

The “total amount of payments” to individuals (salaries, pensions, scholarships, etc.) was planned in cash rubles.

The “total amount of payments” was the monetary equivalent of all creative work performed in the state, one part of which was paid directly to its performers, and the other part was withdrawn through the tax service and paid to “state employees” (officials, military, pensioners, students, etc. ).

The “total amount of payments” always corresponded to the “total total price” of consumer goods and services available in the country intended for sale to the population.

The “total total price,” in turn, was formed from its two main components:

The total price of “social”, vital goods and services (health care, education, housing, vital food and industrial goods, fuel, electricity, transport and housing services).

The total price for “prestigious” goods and services that are not vital (passenger cars, complex household appliances, crystal, carpets, jewelry).

The “highlight” of the two-circuit model was that the state set “optimal” retail prices for consumer goods and services, which did not depend on the cost of their production and reflected the principle of social and economic feasibility:

Prices for “social” goods and services were set much lower than their cost or made them completely free;

Prices for “prestigious” goods and services, accordingly, were set much higher than their cost in such a way as to compensate for losses from lower prices for “social” goods and services as part of the “total total price”.

To justify and maintain high retail prices for “prestigious” goods, they were produced in volumes that supported their constant shortage and excessive demand. For example, the cost of a VAZ 2101 passenger car was 1,950 rubles, and its retail price was 5,500 rubles. Thus, by purchasing this car, the employee contributed 3,550 rubles free of charge to the state treasury, but this money did not disappear anywhere during Soviet times, but was redistributed to pay workers producing cheap or free social goods and services, including:

Cheap transport and housing and communal services;

Cheap gasoline, electricity and vital food and industrial goods;

Free healthcare, education and housing.

Thus:

The main task of the functioning of the non-cash money circulation circuit was to organize the optimal, planned and comprehensive development of all sectors of the national economy, providing for the vital needs of the population and ensuring the sovereignty of the country.

The main objectives of the functioning of the cash circulation circuit were:

Fair distribution of vital goods and services among the population of the USSR.

Material incentives for the fulfillment of established targets, high quality and discipline of work.

In organizations and enterprises there were queues for the purchase of prestigious goods and housing. The leaders of production were among the first to receive these benefits, while the laggards and undisciplined people were among the last.

Maintaining an optimal balance of supply and demand in the domestic market for goods and services at a level that excludes inflationary processes.

The system was very fair - no one was forced to buy “prestigious” goods, everyone, on the contrary, did it with enthusiasm and pleasure, and the overpayment made upon their purchase was returned to everyone as part of a package of social goods and services.

Note: It should be noted that the category of such goods also included tobacco and vodka (!), the demand for which, at any inflated prices, never fell, even with their absolute abundance. These goods were the object of a state monopoly - wages to the military and other government officials were paid from the profits from their sales. Taking into account the volume of its turnover and cost, these products were extremely profitable. Especially vodka. According to some data, the cost of 1 liter of vodka was about 27 kopecks, while its retail price, on average, was about 8 rubles per liter.

THE BEGINNING OF A NEW STAGE OF WORLD HISTORY

Two significant events in the final phase of World War II marked the beginning of a qualitatively new stage in world history:

On September 8, 1944, regular bombardment of London by German V-2 guided ballistic missiles began;

Thus, on our planet, capable industrial designs of fundamentally new guided means of delivering warheads over long distances, as well as fundamentally new warheads of enormous destructive power, were created and used (still separately from each other).

The combination of these two qualities in one type of weapon - a guided ballistic launch vehicle with a nuclear charge could provide its owner with unprecedented military-strategic capabilities, as well as guarantee security from any external threat.

This weapon had great prospects for development, both in achieving unlimited reach of targets and in increasing the power of the delivered charge. It was this factor that aggravated the post-war international situation to the limit, as it served as the impetus for the start of the nuclear missile arms race.

The arms race is an objective, self-sustaining process, developing according to the logic of “confrontation between armor and projectile”, when a potential enemy is forced to respond to the creation of a more advanced weapon of destruction by creating a corresponding effective means of defense (and vice versa) and so on ad infinitum.

Given that the parties have “absolute” nuclear missile weapons, such behavior of the race participants is quite understandable. Everyone fears that as soon as the ratio of their combat capabilities reaches a level where one side can be guaranteed to destroy the other side with impunity or with acceptable damage to itself, it, at its own discretion, can do this at any time convenient for itself.

THE LOGIC OF THE ARMS RACE

It was the “Stalinist economic system” that provided the conditions for preparing the Soviet economy for the inevitable war.

The Soviet Union won the Great Patriotic War, but as a result of the strategic arms race imposed on the USSR by the United States and the countries of Western Europe, which unfolded immediately after its completion, they found themselves in a difficult economic situation. Half the country lay in ruins and there was a chronic shortage of labor resources (in the war the country lost 27 million of its most capable population), and the entire Western world stood against us.

Not falling behind in the race was a matter of life, so the whole country was forced to adapt to its needs.

And the “Stalinist economic system” again confirmed its highest efficiency.

It is precisely thanks to its unique properties that the country was able to handle the greatest scientific and technical projects and the enormous economic costs necessary to create new types of weapons.

Entire industrial sectors and scientific areas had to be created literally from scratch - so in the first half of the 50s, two specialized ministries were created, “tailored” to nuclear missile issues:

06.26.1953 - Ministry of Medium Engineering (MSM) - a specialized industry that was engaged in the development and production of nuclear warheads;

04/02/1955 - Ministry of General Engineering (MOM) - a specialized industry that was engaged in the development and production of rocket and space technology.

The nuclear missile race also caused a sharp increase in the country's demand for aluminum and the capacity of existing aluminum plants was clearly not enough. Aluminum is the main metal from whose alloys rockets, airplanes and spacecraft are made, as well as some types of lightweight armor coating, which is in demand in conditions of the use of nuclear weapons.

Thus, in connection with the beginning of the mass use of aluminum alloys, the organization of its mass production began to be a priority state task. The specificity of aluminum production is that it is very energy-intensive - to produce 1000 kg of rough aluminum it is necessary to spend about 17 thousand kWh of electricity, therefore, first of all, it was necessary to create powerful sources of electricity.

The country tensed up, “tightened its belt” and in the center of Siberia the following were built:

Powerful hydroelectric power plants (HPP):

Bratsk hydroelectric power station (4500 MW) - in 1954-67;

Krasnoyarsk hydroelectric power station (6000 MW) - in 1956-71;

Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP (6400 MW) - in 1963-85

Large aluminum smelters:

Bratsk Aluminum Plant - in 1956 - 66;

Krasnoyarsk Aluminum Plant - in 1959 - 64;

Sayan Aluminum Plant - in 1975 - 85

Due to the urgency of the ongoing tasks to create strategic nuclear missile weapons, the issue of ensuring their implementation with the necessary material and labor resources has become especially acute.

There were no free people and they could only be removed from other, less important areas at that time - that is why shipbuilding programs were curtailed, massive reductions in the Armed Forces and other similar events were carried out.

Some of the industries and scientific areas, for objective reasons, pulled ahead, some lagged behind, but the inexorable laws of the arms race dictated their conditions.

There was no time and it was impossible to wait for the moment of proportional development of all industries and directions, sufficient to create an ideal weapon. At least some kind of deterrent weapon was needed now and immediately - and it was created from what was available, relying on already achieved (not always perfect) scientific, design and technological capabilities.

Thus, the arms race is, first of all, a race of the real economic, organizational, scientific and technological capabilities of the racing states...

COLLEGIALITY AS THE BASIS FOR MAKING ANY DECISIONS ON MILITARY-TECHNICAL ISSUES

The need to create strategic weapons entailed a multiple complication of the designs and technologies used, and therefore, the main distinguishing feature of this new stage was a proportional increase in co-executors of defense work at all levels:

At the top level, dozens of organizations and enterprises - co-executors representing various ministries and departments - are involved in the creation and production of specific types of strategic weapons.

At the lower level - in the creation and production of even an insignificant design element of a specific sample B and VT, as a rule, a significant number of various narrow specialists from various departments (designers, technologists, chemists, etc.) are involved.

Thus, the creation and production of strategic weapons is a very complex joint work of numerous teams representing various industries and departments (rocket scientists, nuclear scientists, shipbuilders, metallurgists, various military specialists, etc.).

This feature of the creation of new weapons has caused an objective need to develop mechanisms for making joint decisions that take into account a mutually acceptable balance of the capabilities of numerous co-executors of this work and the interests of the Customer (USSR Defense Ministry). Since joint collective work was impossible without such a mechanism, one was worked out, created and ideally spelled out in numerous regulatory documents.

In general terms, a joint decision is any organizational and technical document that defines the methods and procedure for solving any technical, organizational or financial problem, sealed with the consenting signatures of interested parties. The established mechanism for making joint decisions on military-technical issues was mandatory for any level of competence - starting from solving an intra-shop problem of an enterprise that manufactures military equipment (at the level of a military representative) and ending with decisions at the national level, by which the strategic desires of military leaders were brought into line with real-life capabilities branches of Soviet industry.

From the first post-war years, under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, units were created and operated in various forms to coordinate the work of the defense industry.

Finally, on December 6, 1957, the Commission on Military-Industrial Issues was created under the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. It was the main collegial body of the country, which coordinated the activities of the military-industrial complex until the end of the Soviet period. The main and most effective form of making collegial decisions on military-technical issues was the Council of Chief Designers, which was introduced into permanent practice back in 1947 by S.P. Korolev.

This body was created under the General Designer and under his chairmanship.

The SGK consisted of the Chief Designers of the complex's composite products and carried out interdepartmental coordination and technical coordination of the work of all enterprises and co-executing organizations. The decisions of the State Control Commission became binding on all bodies. Issues regarding the types of military equipment being accepted for service were finally settled during the work of interdepartmental commissions (IMC). Any decision at the government level has always been based on dozens of joint decisions at lower levels, which were made by qualified specialists on the components of the general problem. And each of these numerous decisions had its own truth and logic. As a rule, this was the only possible and optimal solution for that period of time, based on numerous objective factors and taking into account the interests and capabilities of all parties involved, some of which simply cannot be seen or understood “at a glance” from our present time...

When trying to evaluate the activities of predecessors using text documents, one must keep in mind that the adoption of those distant organizational and military-technical decisions was influenced by many “self-evident” considerations and factors characteristic of that time, which were equally understood and meant by all “signatories” , but, due to their obviousness, they were not even mentioned in the documents. It is always necessary to remember that not every thought taken from the context of a historical period can be understood at another time without additional explanation.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND THE DESTRUCTION OF STATES A

As already mentioned, the double-circuit financial system was created in the 30s of the last century by smart people, led by I.V. Stalin, and this was the only possible option for the further development of the Soviet economy, providing for the vital needs of the population and the sovereignty of the country. These people proved their professionalism and high business qualities even during the years of the Revolution and the Civil War, and during the difficult years of the first five-year plans and the Great Patriotic War, they provided the necessary technical and organizational conditions for Victory over Nazi Germany.

The life resource of these people, unfortunately, was not limitless - I.V. Stalin passed away in 1953, A.N. Kosygin in 1980, L.I. Brezhnev in 1982, D.F. Ustinov in 1984 , in 1984 - Yu.V. Andropov, in 1985 - K.U. Chernenko. These were also those Soviet leaders who understood how the unique mechanism of the Soviet economy worked and what absolutely could not be touched in it.

In 1985, a person who was formed as a personality in post-Stalin times, during the “undercover” struggle and party-apparatus intrigues, took over the highest party and state post of the Soviet Union - this was the beginning of the end of the Soviet economy and state.

It all started with a thoughtless fight against alcoholism...

According to the memoirs of the former chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee N. Baibakov: “According to the 1985 plan, adopted before the anti-alcohol regulations, it was planned to receive 60 billion rubles from the sale of alcoholic beverages. arrived". This was precisely the cash that was used to pay salaries to the military and other government officials.

After the implementation of anti-alcohol regulations, the state treasury received 38 billion rubles in 1986 and 35 billion rubles in 1987.

Then the collapse of economic ties with the CMEA countries began, from where the retail trade network received consumer goods worth about 27 billion rubles in 1985. In 1987, they were received in the amount of 9.8 billion rubles. For these items alone (vodka and imports), an excess of cash rubles amounting to more than 40 billion rubles was formed on the domestic market, not covered by goods...

In 1987, the basic foundations of the Soviet economy were finally destroyed:

- The “Law on State Enterprise (Association)” of 1987 opened the contours of non-cash money - their conversion into cash was allowed;

The state monopoly of foreign trade was actually abolished - from January 1, 1987, such a right was given to 20 ministries and 70 large enterprises.

Then things started to happen - there was a shortage of goods, prices went up and inflation began. In 1989, mass strikes of miners began... Quite predictably, August 1991 came, when the actions of the overgrown and unshaven people of the capital destroyed the last foundations of the Soviet state, created in the interests of all working people...

Note: The notorious “oil needle,” which the “democrats” love to talk about, did not have any decisive influence on the destruction of the domestic consumer market, since only consumer goods from capitalist countries were purchased with petrodollars, the share of which in the total volume of consumer imports was is small - about 17% (the decrease in their volume in the total volume of the consumer market in 1985-87 amounted to approximately from 6 to 2 billion rubles). In settlements with the CMEA countries, where the bulk of consumer imports came from, the internal collective currency of the CMEA, the “transferable ruble,” was used.

Generalissimo I.V. Stalin!

Under Stalin, for the first time in the history of mankind, a crisis-free economy of a huge country was created - the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

In 1948, the volume of industrial production in the USSR not only reached the pre-war level, but also surpassed it. Industry was restored in an exceptionally short time.

After the Civil War, it took the country six years to carry out collectivization and industrialization in the USSR.The enormous losses in the Great Patriotic War are incomparable. However, the industry has now been restored in almost two and a half years.

As a result of the heroic labor of workers and peasants, the tireless organizational activity of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the fourth five-year plan in industry was completed in four years and three months.Over these years, more than six thousand industrial enterprises were restored, built and put into operation, i.e. almost the same number as in the first and second five-year plans taken together.

Gross industrial output in 1950 exceeded the pre-war level by 73 percent, while according to the plan the excess was expected to be 48 percent.The pre-war level of iron smelting was exceeded by 29 percent, steel - by 49 percent, coal production - by 57 percent, oil - by 22 percent. Labor productivity in industry increased by 37 percent.Compared to 1940, in 1950 the USSR's Gross Social Product increased by 161%, and national income generated by 164%.

Production of means of production in 1950 increased by 204%, livestock products - 104%, commissioning of fixed assets - by 192%, capital investments - 196%, the number of workers and employees - by 119%, labor productivity in industry - by 145 %, in agriculture - 100%, in railway transport - by 110%, in construction - by 125%. (National History of the USSR for 60 years. P. 14. M. 1977) Stalin’s rates of economic growth continued after Stalin’s death.

In 1949, collective farms, MTS and state farms received two and a half times more tractors and agricultural machinery than in 1940. Electrification of collective farms, state farms and MTS began. The number of livestock in the western regions has been replenished at the expense of the eastern ones.

At the end of 1952, J. V. Stalin’s last work, “Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR,” was published. In this work, J.V. Stalin, based on the teachings of Marxism - Leninism, revealed the goal of capitalist production:

“The purpose of capitalist production is to make profits. As for consumption, capitalism needs it only insofar as it ensures the task of extracting profits. Outside of this, the question of consumption loses its meaning for capitalism. Man and his consumption disappear from view.”

Based on the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, summarizing the experience of World History, the experience of building socialism in the USSR, J.V. Stalin formulated the Basic Economic Law of Socialism - “Ensuring maximum satisfaction of the constantly growing material and cultural needs of the entire society is the GOAL of socialist production; continuous growth and improvement of socialist production on the basis of higher technology is the MEANS to achieve the goal. (I.V. Stalin. Economic problems of socialism in the USSR. S. 76, 78, M. 1952).

Dear Comrade Stalin!

This law became the basis for the activities of all communist parties building socialism and even the governments of some capitalist countries seeking to mitigate the consequences of economic crises. This will be discussed further.

Stalin's annual price reduction and wage increase is nothing more than an increase in the investment of workers and employees, pensioners and students of the entire huge country in its economy. For example, if a citizen’s purchasing power increases, he spends more money on food and, by investing in agriculture and the food industry, increases their sales volume and, naturally, the profit of these industries.

If his income has increased, he spends more money on clothes and shoes - the light industry helps out. If he has enough money, he builds himself a new or improves existing housing, purchases building materials, makes the industry of building materials and construction organizations more profitable, and so on.

If a citizen has money left over from necessary purchases or there is a need to raise money for a large purchase, he invested the money in the savings bank and from this the savings bank developed. The depositor received interest, and the bank guaranteed him the safety of his money. Such an economy ensured the constant development of all sectors of the country's economy without crises.

Post-war annual decline in retail prices.

Already two and a half years after the end of the Great Patriotic War, in December 1947, a monetary reform was carried out in the USSR, cards for food and industrial goods were abolished, and uniform reduced state retail prices for consumer goods were introduced.

At this first stage of price reduction, the reduction in prices for consumer goods in state retail trade alone amounted to 57 billion rubles during the year. In addition to the reduction in prices on the collective farm and cooperative markets, prices were reduced by 29 billion rubles. In total, budget losses in 1947 from lower retail prices amounted to 86 billion rubles.

This amount was a net loss for the state budget, which was covered due to increased labor productivity, increased production of consumer goods and reduced production costs.

On March 1, 1949, the second stage of reducing prices for consumer goods in state trade in the amount of 48 billion rubles was completed, in addition, in cooperative and collective farm trade - in the amount of 23 billion rubles.

The Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) stated that “as a result of a new reduction in prices, the purchasing power of the ruble will again significantly increase and the ruble exchange rate will improve compared to the exchange rate of foreign currencies, the real wages of workers and intellectuals will again increase and costs will again significantly decrease peasants for the purchase of industrial goods."

“In this event, the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet government showed with renewed vigor a great concern for the working people, for their prosperity, for the growth of well-being and culture,” reported in the editorial of the Pravda newspaper on March 1, 1949.

By the indicated Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, prices were reduced in the following amounts:

• bread, flour and bakery products, cereals and pasta, meat and sausages, fish and fish products, butter and ghee, wool and silk fabrics, furs, hardware and electrical goods, cameras and binoculars, and a number of other goods - for 10 %;
• coats, suits, dresses and other garments made of woolen fabrics - by 12%; dresses, shirts, blouses and other garments made of silk fabrics, shoes, hats - by 15%;
• cheese and cheese, perfumes, hardware and saddlery, individual tailoring, dishes and household appliances made of plastic, motorcycles and bicycles, radios, pianos, accordions, button accordions, gramophone records, jewelry, typewriters - by 20%;
• TVs, vodka - by 25%;
• salt, cement, gramophones, watches, hay - by 30%.

The same Resolution reduced prices accordingly: in restaurants, canteens, tea houses and other catering establishments. (Pravda newspaper, March 1, 1949)

Meetings and rallies were held at enterprises throughout the country, at which the workers were informed of the Resolution “About a new price reduction...”

Reductions in retail prices in the USSR, especially after the Great Patriotic War, during Stalin’s lifetime, were carried out annually. The first post-war five-year plan for the restoration and development of the national economy of the USSR was completed ahead of schedule - in four years and three months. The production of grain, meat, oil, cotton, flax, and wool increased significantly.

National income in the last year of the five-year plan increased by 64% compared to 1940, and by 12% over the last year. An editorial in the Pravda newspaper on April 1, 1952 noted:

“Comrade Stalin teaches that the essential features of the basic economic law of socialism is to ensure maximum satisfaction of the ever-growing material and cultural needs of the entire society through the continuous growth and improvement of socialist production on the basis of higher technology.”

This Stalinist policy ensured the development of the USSR economy without crises for many decades.

On April 1, 1952, based on the powerful growth of industry and agriculture, the fifth post-war price reduction was carried out totaling 53 billion rubles, which caused general jubilation among the population.

How high were the growth rates of industry during the years of Stalin’s five-year plans is shown by the following data:

“Produced national income in 1950, compared to 1913, increased by 8.8 times, all industrial output by 13 times, production of means of production (group A) by 27 times, and social labor productivity by 8.4 times.” . (National Economy of the USSR for 60 years. P.12. M. 1977)

After Stalin's death, and even after the condemnation of his personality cult, a policy of regular salary increases was implemented, prices remained unchanged.

With the cessation of the decline in retail prices, the growth rate of national income began to decline. In 1980–85 it averaged only 3% per year. The XXV11th Congress of the CPSU set the task of increasing the growth rate of national income in 1986–90 to 5% on average per year. (Materials of the XXV11th Congress of the CPSU. P. 228, M. 1987) Let us recall that during the Stalin period the growth rate of national income was 9–12% per year.

Fragment from the book of the Chairman of the All-Ukrainian Association “ZUBR” Elena Mazur and Mykola Lativok “1932–1933: famine in Europe and America. 1992–2009: genocide in Ukraine. Facts and documents. Analysis. Series “For the Union of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia.”

Elena Mazur, Nikolay Lativok

Celebrating the thirtieth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution at the Bolshoi Theater:

dated March 1, 1949, No. 49 (9889):

1. During the monetary reform and abolition of the card system at the end of 1947, high prices for commercial trade were abolished and uniform, reduced state retail prices for consumer goods were introduced. This was the first stage of reducing prices for consumer goods. The price reduction at the first stage led to a reduction in the price of consumer goods through state retail trade during the year by at least 57 billion rubles. This amount represented a net loss for the state budget, which had to be covered, and indeed it was subsequently covered by the Government thanks to an increase in labor productivity, an increase in the production of consumer goods, and a decrease in production costs. But at the same time it was a net gain for the population.

But the matter could not stop there. A reduction in prices for goods through state retail trade should have caused the same reduction in prices on the collective farm and cooperative markets. Since the share of collective farm and cooperative goods in the total mass of goods sold to the population during the year is about 33%, the result was that the reduction in prices for goods of collective farm and cooperative trade resulted in a reduction in the price of these goods by at least 29 billion rubles.

Consequently, the population benefited from price reductions in all retail sectors during the year in total of about 86 billion rubles.

This means that as a result of the reduction in prices at the first stage, the purchasing power of the ruble increased significantly, the exchange rate of the ruble improved compared to the exchange rate of foreign currencies, the wages of workers and intellectuals increased significantly, and the costs of peasants for the purchase of industrial goods decreased significantly.

2. In connection with the further rise of the national economy of the USSR, the growth in the production of consumer goods and new achievements in the field of reducing production costs in the second half of 1948, an opportunity was created to implement a new reduction in prices for consumer goods. The Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decided to implement this second price reduction, which had already partially begun in 1948, and to complete it completely on March 1, 1949. This will be the second stage of reducing prices for consumer goods.

A new price reduction in the amounts in which it is planned by this resolution will lead to a new, additional reduction in the price of consumer goods in the public sector of retail trade on an annual basis by at least 48 million rubles. This loss to the state budget, which at the same time represents a net gain for the population, must be covered by the Government through a series of economic measures, despite the serious difficulties that will have to be overcome.

If we take into account the fact that a new reduction in prices in the public sector of retail trade will cause an immediate and basically the same reduction in prices in the cooperative and collective farm sectors, then it should be recognized that the population will benefit from a new reduction in prices for collective farm and cooperative goods by an additional 23 billion rubles

Consequently, the population will benefit from a new price reduction in all sectors of retail trade in the current second stage during the year of only about 71 billion rubles.

This means that as a result of the new price reduction, the purchasing power of the ruble will again significantly increase and the ruble exchange rate will improve compared to the exchange rate of foreign currencies, the real wages of workers and intellectuals will again significantly increase, and peasants’ expenses for the purchase of industrial goods will again significantly decrease.

The Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decide:

a) Reduce, from March 1, 1949, state retail prices for consumer goods by an average of the following amounts:

Bread and flour 10%

Cereals and pasta by 10%

Grain fodder, cakes, bran, feed by 20%

Hay by 30%

Cookies, gingerbreads, cakes at 10%

Meat, sausages and canned goods by 10%

Fish and fish products by 10%

Butter and ghee 10%

Cheese and feta cheese at 20%

Salt 30%

Vodka 28%

Liquor products by 25%

Fortified grape wines, cognacs and fruits by 15%

Tobacco products by 10%

Perfume products by 20%

Coats, suits, dresses and other garments made from wool fabrics by 12%

Dresses, shirts, blouses and other garments made from silk fabrics by 15%

Wool fabrics 10%

Silk fabrics 10%

Individual tailoring in ateliers and workshops at 20%

Threads by 15%

Silk stockings and socks 15%

Textile and combined footwear by 15%

Headwear (hats and caps) by 15%

Textile haberdashery by 15%

Stitching products by 15%

Fur by 10%

Metal haberdashery and leatherette haberdashery by 10%

Products made of plastic and celluloid (dishes, household appliances and others) by 20%

Metal goods (electric kettles, electric stoves, electric irons and others) by 10%

Hardware by 20%

Saddlery goods by 20%

Cement 30%

Motorcycles by 15%

Bicycles at 20%

Radios by 20%

TVs at 25%

Pianos, accordions, button accordions and harmonicas by 20%

Gramophones at 30%

Gramophone and gramophone records by 20%

Hours at 30%

Jewelry 20% off

Typewriters by 20%

Cameras and binoculars at 10%

Reduce prices in restaurants, canteens, tea houses and other catering establishments accordingly.

b) Instruct the USSR Ministry of Trade to establish, in accordance with this resolution, new reduced state retail prices for the food, feed and industrial goods listed in paragraph “a” of this resolution.

Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks

I. STALIN G. MALENKOV

I.V. Stalin saw the future of the USSR this way:

“It is necessary to achieve such a cultural growth of society that would provide all members of society with the comprehensive development of their physical and mental abilities, so that members of society have the opportunity to receive an education sufficient to become active figures in social development, so that they have opportunity to freely choose a profession, and not be chained for life, due to the existing division of labor, to one particular profession.

What is required for this?

It would be wrong to think that such a serious cultural growth of the members of society can be achieved without serious changes in the present state of labor. For this you need first of all reduce the working day to at least 6, and then to 5 hours. This is necessary to ensure that members of society receive enough free time necessary to receive a comprehensive education. To do this, it is necessary, further, to introduce compulsory polytechnic training, which is necessary so that members of society have the opportunity to freely choose a profession and not be chained to one profession for the rest of their lives. To do this, it is necessary, further, to radically improve living conditions and raise the real wages of workers and employees at least twice, if not more, both by directly increasing monetary wages