240 years ago, on July 21, 1774, near the village of Kuchuk-Kaynarji, a peace treaty was concluded between the Russian and Ottoman empires, which ended the first Turkish war of Empress Catherine II. The Treaty of 1774 decided the fate of the Crimean Khanate (this state entity gained independence from the Porte and soon became part of Russia) and began the process of annexing the territory of the Northern Black Sea region (Novorossiya) to Russia, which was completed in 1812 with the annexation of Bessarabia. At the same time, the decline of the Ottoman Empire began and Russia’s position on the Balkan Peninsula gradually strengthened.

Russian-Turkish War of 1768-1774

The Kuchuk-Kainardzhi Peace Treaty was the result of the war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. This war was a consequence of the European Great Game - the confrontation between the alliance of the northern states (Russia, Prussia, Denmark, Sweden and Poland) with the support of England with France and Austria. One of the fronts of this war took place in Poland. After the death of the Polish king Augustus III in 1763, with the support of Russia, Stanislav Poniatowski was elevated to the throne. However, the Bar Confederation, which was oriented towards Austria and France, entered against him and the Russian troops.

The Confederates, with the support of France, turned to the Ottoman Empire for help. Bribes from the Poles to Ottoman dignitaries, the concession of Volhynia and Podolia if Turkey sided with the Bar Confederation and pressure from France led to Istanbul agreeing to join forces against Russia. The Porta considered that the opportune moment had come to restore a number of lost positions in the Northern Black Sea region.

The reason for the war was a border incident in the village of Balta (modern Odessa region). During the fighting against the Bar Confederation, a detachment of Koli (Orthodox rebels in Western Russian lands who fought against the Polish yoke), pursuing the Confederates, entered Balta, which was then part of the Ottoman Empire. At the local level, the conflict was settled quite quickly; there were many similar border incidents at that time. However, it was this incident in Istanbul that they decided to use as a pretext for war. The Russian ambassador Alexei Obreskov was thrown into the Seven Towers Castle.

Porta accused Russia of violating previous agreements. Thus, previously Russia promised not to interfere in the affairs of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and not to send its troops into Polish lands. Russia was also accused of building border fortresses directed against Turkey, ruining Balta and placing an “unworthy” person on the Polish throne. On September 25, 1768, Sultan Mustafa III declared war on the Russian state. Autumn and winter passed in preparation for war.

The Ottoman command planned to field 600 thousand. army for the war with Russia. The main forces of the army were to march from the Danube region to Poland and unite with the Polish confederates. Then the Polish-Turkish troops were supposed to move to Kyiv and Smolensk. Russia's enemies hoped to restore the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth within the borders of the 17th century, creating a powerful buffer state between Europe and Russia. The second Turkish army aimed at Azov and Taganrog, here it was supposed to be supported by the Crimean Tatars, and from the sea by the Ottoman fleet. In addition, part of the forces was allocated to suppress the Christian uprising in Montenegro and Herzegovina. Thus, the plans of Russia's enemies were very grandiose. With the hands of Turkey, the West hoped to squeeze the Russians out of Poland and the Azov-Black Sea region and even capture Kyiv and Smolensk.

The Russian Empire fielded three armies. The 1st Army under the command of Golitsyn (80 thousand soldiers) was supposed to concentrate in the Kyiv area and conduct offensive operations against the main forces of the enemy. The 2nd Army under the command of the Governor-General of Little Russia Rumyantsev (40 thousand bayonets and sabers) gathered at Bakhmut and was given the task of defending the southern borders of Russia. The 3rd Army under the command of Olitsa (15 thousand people) gathered at Brody and played a supporting role.

1769 The actual fighting began at the beginning of 1769. 10 thousand The Turkish-Tatar corps invaded Little Russia from Crimea. However, Rumyantsev repelled this blow and himself sent a punitive detachment to the Crimea, and also strengthened the garrisons of Azov and Taganrog. By the summer, Rumyantsev transferred his main forces to Elizavetgrad, but could not advance further, since the troops were gathering slowly, and he had only 30 thousand people (including 10 thousand poorly armed Cossacks). While the Crimean Khan stood on the Dniester with 100 thousand. the Turkish-Tatar army and 30 thousand Crimean Tatars threatened a new attack from Perekop. But Rumyantsev, spreading rumors about the movement of a strong Russian army to Podolia, changed the situation in his favor. Rumors about the offensive of Rumyantsev's army confused the calculations of the Ottoman command, which abandoned the original plan of the offensive. The center of hostilities shifted to the Dniester.

Initially, the fighting in the Danube region was sluggish. Moldavia rebelled against the Porte, its ruler fled. The Archbishop of Iasi asked to accept Moldova into Russian citizenship. But, 45 thousand. Golitsyn's army (it was not possible to bring the army to the planned size), instead of immediately occupying Iasi, moved to Khotyn. He was unable to take a strong fortress, having lost time and feeling a shortage of provisions, the prince withdrew his troops beyond the Dniester. As a result, the strategic initiative was lost, and the Ottomans were allowed to suppress the uprising in Bessarabia.

The Turks also showed no initiative. Grand Vizier with 200 thousand. The army crossed the Danube and moved to Bessarabia. The Turkish-Tatar troops stood aimlessly on the Prut for a whole month until half of June. The Ottoman command invited the Poles to launch an offensive together in Poland. But the Poles, not wanting to see hordes of Ottomans and Tatars in their lands, invited the Turkish army to march against Rumyantsev in Novorossiya. Directing a barrier against Golitsyn.

The vizier accepted this plan. 60 thousand were sent to Khotyn. auxiliary army, and the main forces were going to attack Elizavetgrad. But this campaign was not a success. Rumors about Rumyantsev's strong army confused the Ottomans, and the vizier did not dare to cross the Dniester, returning back to the Prut in the Ryabaya Mogila tract. To strengthen Khotin, the vizier sent Seraskir Moldavanchi Pasha.

Golitsyn again decided to move towards Khotin. It was a dangerous maneuver. Golitsyn moved away from Rumyantsev’s army and could not help it. If there had been a more decisive and proactive commander in the place of the vizier, then the huge Turkish army could have struck Kyiv and tried to defeat Rumyantsev’s army. On June 24, Golitsyn crossed the Dniester, overthrew the Turkish-Tatar army near the village of Pashkivtsi and blocked Khotyn. But the arrival of the army of Seraskir Moldavanchi and the Crimean Khan Devlet-Girey forced Golitsyn to lift the siege and retreat beyond the Dniester. It must be said that Golitsyn was a fan of the school of maneuver warfare, which believed that the main thing in war is maneuver, and not a decisive battle. Therefore, Golitsyn believed that his task was completed - he had distracted the enemy from Novorossiya.

The vizier's lack of initiative and his theft (he stole 25 million piastres allocated to supply the army) forced the Sultan to replace him with Moldavanchi Pasha. The new commander-in-chief received orders to cross the Dniester and occupy Podolia. However, the Turkish offensive ended in failure. At the end of August 80 thousand. The Turkish-Tatar army crossed the river, but was thrown into the Dniester by Golitsyn’s troops. And 12 thousand. The Turkish detachment, which was sent across the Dniester for foraging on September 5, was completely destroyed by Russian troops.

Defeats, shortages of food and fodder, and theft of command completely demoralized the Turkish army. Almost the entire army fled to their homes. The Moldavian Pasha in Iasi was almost killed by his own people, he barely escaped. Only about 5 thousand soldiers remained at Ryaba Mogila, the rest deserted. All that remained was a strong garrison in Bendery, small detachments in the Danube fortresses and a Crimean Tatar horde in Kaushany. Devlet-Girey soon also disbanded his troops.

But the Russian command did not take advantage of the complete collapse of the Ottoman army. Golitsyn only occupied Khotyn without a fight - 163 guns became Russian trophies. However, soon he retreated beyond the Dniester again (for the third time). Catherine II, dissatisfied with such passivity, replaced Golitsyn with Rumyantsev. The 2nd Russian Army was led by Pyotr Panin.

Rumyantsev, taking into account the fact that the main forces of the Ottomans had gone beyond the Danube, the Confederate detachments did not pose a threat, and the approach of winter, postponed the resumption of hostilities until the spring of next year. The main Russian forces were located between the Dniester, Bug and Zbruch. 17 thousand the vanguard (Moldavian Corps) under the command of General Shtofeln was advanced beyond the Dniester and Prut - into Moldova. Shtofeln was also entrusted with the management of Moldova. Rumyantsev brought the troops in order. The regiments were united into brigades, and the brigades into divisions. Artillery control was decentralized - artillery companies were transferred to divisions. In winter, exercises were carried out, special attention was paid to horse attacks and speed of movement.

Shtofeln's vanguard in November captured all of Moldavia to Galati and most of Wallachia, capturing two hospodars. The fighting continued throughout the winter. Turkish-Tatar troops. Taking advantage of the small number of the Moldavian Corps and the scattered nature of its forces, they tried to defeat the Russian advanced forces. However, there were beats everywhere. The enemy was defeated at Focsani, at Zhurzhi and at Bucharest. Russian troops took Brailov.

The Russian 2nd Army unsuccessfully tried to attack Crimea, but the campaign failed (due to drought). The siege of Bender also failed. And due to the lack of siege artillery, the idea of siege of the fortress had to be abandoned. Russian troops in the Caucasian direction operated successfully. The detachments of General Medem and Totleben forced the Kabardians and residents of the upper reaches of the Kuban to recognize Russian power.

D. Khodovetsky. "Battle of Kagul"

1770 The collapse of the army and the successes of the Russian troops had a demoralizing effect on the Ottomans and especially their allies - the Crimean Tatars. However, the Ottoman Sultan was not going to retreat. Regardless of the costs, he formed a new army. The Crimean Khan Devlet-Girey, who did not show zeal in this war, was replaced by Kaplan-Girey. The Tatars had to prepare for a campaign from Causeni to Iasi in order to defeat the Moldavian corps before the main Russian forces arrived and capture Moldavia and Wallachia.

The Russian war plan was drawn up by Rumyantsev, who obtained from the empress St. Petersburg’s non-interference in his orders. He considered his main task to be the destruction of the main enemy forces. The 1st Army was supposed to attack the enemy and prevent the Ottomans from crossing the Danube. The 2nd Army received the task of defending Little Russia and taking Bendery. The 3rd Army was disbanded and became part of the 1st Army. In addition, the Russian squadron under the command of Orlov was supposed to support the Greek uprising in the Morea and the Archipelago in the Mediterranean Sea and threaten Constantinople, tying up the forces of the Turkish fleet. Shtofeln was ordered to clear Wallachia and concentrate forces for the defense of Eastern Moldavia until the main forces arrived.

Rumyantsev, having received news of the impending enemy offensive and the critical situation of the Moldavian Corps, set out before the army was completed. The Russian commander had 32 thousand people - 10 infantry and 4 cavalry brigades. The brigades were consolidated into three divisions under the command of Olits, Plemyannikov and Bruce. The plague that raged in Moldova forced Rumyantsev to stay in Northern Moldova.

But the worsening situation - a significant part of the Moldavian corps and Shtofeln himself died from the plague - forced Rumyantsev to continue the offensive. Prince Repnin led the remnants of the Russian avant-garde on the Prut at the Ryabaya Mogila and from May 20 repelled the attacks of 70 thousand. hordes of Kaplan-Girey. On the night of June 17, Rumyantsev, with a roundabout maneuver, forced the superior forces of the Turkish-Tatar army to retreat. On June 24-26, the Russian squadron under the command of Orlov and Spiridov destroyed the Ottoman fleet in the Battle of Chesme.

Rumyantsev did not wait for the army of the Crimean Khan to unite with the army of the vizier. On July 7 (18), 1770, Rumyantsev’s army defeated 80 thousand. Turkish-Tatar army under the command of Kaplan-Girey at the Battle of Larga. Smaller in number, but superior to the enemy in morale, organization and skill, the Russian army completely defeated the enemy. The enemy fled in panic. 33 guns became Russian trophies.

On July 21 (August 1), 1770, Rumyantsev defeated the vizier on the Cahul River. Vizier Moldavanchi had 150 thousand under his command. army, including 50 thousand. selected infantry, with 350 guns, and planned to crush the Russian troops. Rumyantsev had 17 thousand people under arms. The Russian commander was ahead of the enemy and himself struck the Turkish-Tatar horde. The Russian army, with three divisional squares, overthrew the entire enemy horde. The vizier and the Crimean Khan fled, 200 guns were captured. Only the Janissaries valiantly counterattacked the division of General Plemyannikov, and almost turned the tide of the battle. But Rumyantsev personally rushed into battle and shouted “stop, guys!” saved the situation. This decisive battle ended with the defeat of the brave Janissaries. After the victory, Russian troops pursued the enemy and, at the crossing of the Danube and near Kartal, finished off the frustrated enemy army. The remaining Turkish artillery park was captured - 150 guns, and Izmail was taken. Moldavanchi, after crossing the Danube, was able to gather only 10 thousand soldiers. The rest fled.

The campaign of 1770 ended with the complete victory of the Russian armed forces. If Rumyantsev had reserves, it would have been possible to cross the Danube and put a victorious point in the war, forcing the Sultan to capitulate. However, Rumyantsev had only one wartime division, and the plague was raging across the Danube. Therefore, the commander limited himself to strengthening the position in the Danube principalities and capturing enemy fortresses. In August they took Kiliya, in early November - Brailov. This ended the campaign.

The Russian 2nd Army also fought successfully. On September 16, after a brutal assault, Russian troops took Bendery. Out of 18 thousand The Turkish garrison killed 5 thousand people, another 11 thousand were captured, the rest fled. Russian troops lost 2.5 thousand people killed and wounded. 348 guns were captured in the fortress. Soon Ackerman was also captured.

I. Aivazovsky. "Chesme fight"

1771 The strategic initiative completely passed to the Russian army. In the campaign of 1771, the main role was played by the 2nd Army, whose strength was increased to 70 thousand people. She was supposed to capture Crimea. This was made easier by the fact that the replacement of the Crimean Khan by Porta prepared discord between the Turks and the Crimean Tatars. In addition, major defeats demoralized the Crimeans. Their allies, the Budzhak and Yedisan hordes, wandering between the lower reaches of the Dniester and Bug, fell away from Turkey.

The 1st Army switched to strategic defense. 35 thousand Rumyantsev's army needed to defend a huge front along the Danube (500 versts). In February, the Olitsa division took the Zhurzhu fortress. The Turkish garrison was exterminated - out of 10 thousand people, 8 thousand soldiers were killed or drowned. 82 guns were captured in the fortress. Russian troops lost about 1 thousand people.

Meanwhile, the Ottoman Sultan, not wanting to give up and not losing hope of a turning point in the war (he was supported in this by the Western powers), formed a new army. The new vizier Musin-Oglu reorganized the army with the help of French military specialists. Only regular forces were left in the army and their number was increased to 160 thousand people. The Turkish army was concentrated in the Danube fortresses, and from May 1771, it began to make raids into Wallachia, trying to push back the Russian troops. These attempts continued until late autumn, but were unsuccessful. The Turkish army was unable to realize its numerical advantage.

Moreover, in October the Ottomans were demoralized by Weisman's raid. Having crossed the Lower Danube, Weisman's detachment made a brilliant raid through Dobrudja, capturing all the Turkish fortresses: Tulcea, Isakchu, Babadag and Machin. He instilled such fear in the Ottomans that the vizier (who had 25 thousand troops against Weisman's 4 thousand soldiers) fled to Bazardzhik and expressed his readiness to begin peace negotiations.

The campaign of the 2nd Army under the command of Prince Dolgorukov was crowned with complete success. In June, Perekop was taken, after which Russian troops occupied Kafa and Gezlev. The Azov flotilla played a major role in this campaign. The Crimean Khanate declared independence from Turkey and came under Russian protectorate. Leaving a few garrisons, the Russian army left the Crimean Peninsula.

1772-1773 The Russian successes began to greatly alarm the Western powers; they began to exert political and diplomatic pressure on Russia. The first partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1772 allowed Russia to resolve differences with Austria and Prussia.

There was a lull on the fronts. Almost the entire year of 1772 and the beginning of 1773, peace negotiations with the Ottomans took place in Focsani and Bucharest. However, the Porte did not want to give up Crimea. France stood behind Turkey, which incited the Ottomans not to yield to the Russians, so the war continued.

Empress Catherine demanded decisive action, but Rumyantsev, constrained by a lack of strength, limited himself to a number of raids. Weisman made a raid on Karasu and Suvorov made two searches on Turtukai. In June, Rumyantsev tried to attack Silistria (it was defended by a 30,000-strong garrison), but upon receiving news of the Turkish army moving to his rear, he retreated beyond the Danube. Weisman defeated the Turks at Kaynarji, but he himself fell in this battle (5 thousand Russians against 20 thousand Ottomans, five thousand Turks were exterminated). The death of “Russian Achilles” saddened the entire army. Alexander Suvorov, who was friends with him, wrote: “Weisman was gone, I was left alone...”.

1774 Rumyantsev, despite the lack of troops and other problems, decided to deliver a decisive blow to the enemy and reach the Balkans. Your 50 thousand He divided the army into 4 corps (detachments). The main role was to be played by the corps of Kamensky and Suvorov, each with 10 thousand bayonets and sabers. They received the task of advancing on Shumla and defeating the vizier's army. Repnin's corps was their reserve. Saltykov's corps operated in the Silistrian direction. Rumyantsev's corps constituted the general reserve.

At the end of April, the detachments of Suvorov and Kamensky crossed the Danube and cleared Dobruja of the Turks. On June 9 (20), the united Russian corps defeated 40 thousand. the army of Hadji Abdur-Rezak. Then Russian troops blocked Shumla. Rumyantsev crossed the Danube, and Saltykov was sent to Rushchuk. The Russian cavalry moved beyond the Balkans, spreading terror and panic everywhere. The Turkish front collapsed again.

The vizier, seeing the impossibility of further struggle and foreseeing a catastrophe, asked for a truce. But Rumyantsev refused him, saying that he was ready to talk only about peace. The vizier submitted to the will of the great Russian commander.

Pyotr Alexandrovich Rumyantsev-Zadunaisky (1725 -1796)

On July 10 (July 21), the Kuchuk-Kainardzhi Peace Treaty was signed. On the part of Russia, the agreement was signed by Lieutenant General Prince Nikolai Repnin, on the part of the Ottoman Empire - by the keeper of the Sultan's monogram Nitaji-Rasmi-Ahmed and Minister of Foreign Affairs Ibrahim Munib. The Crimean Khanate gained independence from the Ottoman Empire. The annexation of Crimea to Russia was now a matter of time. Greater and Lesser Kabarda became part of the Russian Empire. Russia held Azov, Kerch, Yenikale and Kinburn, with the adjacent steppe between the Dnieper and the Bug.

Russian ships could freely navigate Turkish waters and enjoyed the same benefits as French and English ships. Russia receives the right to have its own navy in the Black Sea and the right of passage through the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits.

Türkiye granted amnesty and religious freedom to Balkan Christians. The Russian Empire recognized the right to protect and patronize Christians in the Danube principalities. The amnesty also extended to Georgia and Mingrelia. The Porte also pledged to no longer take human tribute (boys and girls) from Georgian lands. Russian subjects received the right to visit Jerusalem and other holy places without any payment. Türkiye paid a military indemnity of 4.5 million rubles.

The treaty became preliminary, as it could not satisfy Turkey, which thirsted for revenge, and its Western allies, who were urging the Ottomans to resume hostilities in order to oust the Russians from the Northern Black Sea region. Almost immediately, the Ottomans began to violate the terms of the peace agreement. The Porta did not allow Russian ships to pass from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea, carried out subversive work in the Crimea and did not pay indemnity.

And for Russia, the agreement was only the first step to secure the Northern Black Sea region. It was necessary to continue the offensive in order to bring the Black (Russian) Sea back under control.

Ratification document for the Kyuchuk-Kainardzhi Peace Treaty with the personal signature of Catherine II

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To develop trade, Russia needed access to the Black Sea coast. However, the government of Catherine 2 sought to postpone the start of the armed conflict until other problems were resolved. But such a policy was regarded by the Ottoman Empire as weakness.

Therefore, Turkey declared war on Russia in October 1768; it wanted to take away Taganrog and Azov from it and thus “close” Russia’s access to the Black Sea. This was the real reason for the outbreak of a new war against Russia. The fact that France, supporting the Polish confederates, would like to weaken Russia also played a role. This pushed Turkey to war with its northern neighbor. The reason for the opening of hostilities was the attack of the Haidamaks on the border town of Balta. And although Russia caught and punished the culprits, the flames of war flared up.

Russia's strategic goals were broad. The military college chose a defensive form of strategy, trying to secure its western and southern borders, especially since outbreaks of hostilities arose both here and there. Thus, Russia sought to preserve previously conquered territories. But the option of broad offensive actions was not excluded, which ultimately prevailed.

The military board decided to field three armies against Turkey: the 1st under the command of Prince A.M. Golitsyn, numbering 80 thousand people, consisting of 30 infantry and 19 cavalry regiments with 136 guns with a formation place near Kyiv, had the task of protecting the western borders of Russia and diverting enemy forces. 2nd Army under the command of P.A. Rumyantsev, with 40 thousand people, having 14 infantry and 16 cavalry regiments, 10 thousand Cossacks, with 50 guns, concentrated at Bakhmut with the task of securing the southern borders of Russia. Finally, the 3rd Army under the command of General Olitz (15 thousand people, 11 infantry and 10 cavalry regiments with 30 field guns) gathered near the village of Brody in readiness to “join” the actions of the 1st and 2nd armies.

Sultan Mustafa of Turkey concentrated more than 100 thousand soldiers against Russia, thus not gaining superiority in the number of troops. Moreover, three-quarters of his army consisted of irregular units. The fighting developed sluggishly, although the initiative belonged to the Russian troops. Golitsyn besieged Khotyn, diverting forces to himself and preventing the Turks from connecting with the Polish confederates. Even as the 1st Army approached, Moldova rebelled against the Turks. But instead of moving troops to Iasi, the army commander continued the siege of Khotin. The Turks took advantage of this and dealt with the uprising. Until half of June 1769, the commander of the 1st Army, Golitsyn, stood on the Prut. The decisive moment in the struggle came when the Turkish army tried to cross the Dniester, but it failed to cross due to the decisive actions of Russian troops, who threw the Turks into the river with artillery and rifle fire. No more than 5 thousand people remained from the Sultal's army of one hundred thousand. Golitsyn could freely go deeper into enemy territory, but limited himself to occupying Khotyn without a fight, and then retreating beyond the Dniester. Apparently, he considered his task completed.

Catherine II, closely following the progress of military operations, was dissatisfied with Golitsyn’s passivity. She removed him from command of the army. P.A. was appointed in his place. Rumyantsev. Things got better.

As soon as Rumyantsev arrived in the army at the end of October 1769, he changed its deployment, placing it between Zbruch and Bug. From here he could immediately begin military operations, and at the same time, in the event of a Turkish offensive, protect the western borders of Russia, or even launch an offensive himself. By order of the commander, a corps of 17 thousand cavalry under the command of General Shtofeln advanced beyond the Dniester to Moldova. The general acted energetically, and with battles by November he liberated Moldavia to Galati and captured most of Wallachia. At the beginning of January 1770, the Turks tried to attack Shtofeln’s corps, but were repulsed.

Rumyantsev, having thoroughly studied the enemy and his methods of action, made organizational changes in the army. The regiments were united into brigades, and artillery companies were distributed among divisions. The plan for the 1770 campaign was drawn up by Rumyantsev, and, having received the approval of the Military Collegium and Catherine II, acquired the force of an order. The peculiarity of the plan is its focus on the destruction of enemy manpower. “No one takes a city without first dealing with the forces defending it,” Rumyantsev believed.

On May 12, 1770, Rumyantsev’s troops concentrated at Khotin. Rumyantsev had 32 thousand people under arms. At this time, a plague epidemic was raging in Moldova. A significant part of the corps located here and the commander himself, General Shtofeln, died from the plague. The new corps commander, Prince Repnin, led the remaining troops to positions near the Prut. They had to show extraordinary resilience, repelling the attacks of the Tatar horde of Kaplan-Girey.

Rumyantsev brought the main forces only on June 16 and, immediately forming them into battle formation (while providing for a deep detour of the enemy), attacked the Turks at the Ryabaya Mogila and threw them east to Bessarabia. Attacked by the main forces of the Russians on the flank, pinned down from the front and outflanked from the rear, the enemy fled. The cavalry pursued the fleeing Turks for more than 20 kilometers. A natural obstacle - the Larga River - made the pursuit difficult. The Turkish commander decided to wait for the arrival of the main forces, the vizier Moldavanchi and the cavalry of Abaza Pasha. Rumyantsev decided not to wait for the approach of the Turkish main forces and to attack and defeat the Turks in parts. On July 7, at dawn, having made a roundabout maneuver at night, he suddenly attacked the Turks on Larga and put them to flight. What brought him victory? This is most likely the advantage of Russian troops in combat training and discipline over Turkish units, which were usually lost in a surprise attack combined with a cavalry attack on the flank. At Larga, the Russians lost 90 people, the Turks - up to 1000. Meanwhile, the vizier Moldavanchi crossed the Danube with an army of 150 thousand of 50 thousand Janissaries and 100 thousand Tatar cavalry. Knowing about Rumyantsev's limited forces, the vizier was convinced that he would crush the Russians with a 6-fold advantage in manpower. Moreover, he knew that Abaz Pashi was hurrying to him.

This time Rumyantsev did not wait for the main enemy forces to approach. What did the disposition of troops look like near the river? Cahul, where the battle was to take place. The Turks camped near the village of Grecheni near. Cahula. The Tatar cavalry stood 20 versts from the main forces of the Turks. Rumyantsev built an army in five divisional squares, that is, he created a deep battle formation. He placed the cavalry between them. The heavy cavalry of 3,500 sabers under the command of Saltykov and Dolgorukov, together with the Melissino artillery brigade, remained in the army reserve. Such a deep battle formation of the army units ensured the success of the offensive, since it implied a build-up of forces during the offensive. Early in the morning of July 21, Rumyantsev attacked the Turks with three divisional squares and overthrew their crowds. Saving the situation, 10 thousand Janissaries rushed into a counterattack, but Rumyantsev personally rushed into battle and, by his example, inspired the soldiers who put the Turks to flight. The vizier fled, leaving the camp and 200 cannons. The Turks lost up to 20 thousand killed and 2 thousand prisoners. Pursuing the Turks, Bour's vanguard overtook them at the crossing of the Danube at Kartala and captured the remaining artillery in the amount of 130 guns.

Almost at the same time, on Kagul, the Russian fleet destroyed the Turkish fleet at Chesma. Russian squadron under the command of General A.G. Orlova had almost half the number of ships, but won the battle thanks to the heroism and courage of the sailors and the naval skill of Admiral Spiridov, the actual organizer of the battle. By his order, the vanguard of the Russian squadron entered Chesme Bay on the night of June 26 and, having anchored, opened fire with incendiary shells. By morning, the Turkish squadron was completely defeated. 15 battleships, 6 frigates and over 40 small ships were destroyed, while the Russian fleet had no losses in ships. As a result, Turkey lost its fleet and was forced to abandon offensive operations in the Archipelago and concentrate its efforts on the defense of the Dardanelles Strait and coastal fortresses.

Battle of Chesme June 27, 1770 Russian-Turkish War 1768-1774 In order to keep the military initiative in his hands, Rumyantsev sends several detachments to capture Turkish fortresses. He managed to take Ishmael, Kelia and Ackerman. In early November, Brailov fell. Panin's 2nd Army took Bendery by storm after a two-month siege. Russian losses amounted to 2,500 killed and wounded. The Turks lost up to 5 thousand people killed and wounded and 11 thousand prisoners. 348 guns were taken from the fortress. Leaving a garrison in Bendery, Panin and his troops retreated to the Poltava region.

In the campaign of 1771, the main task fell to the 2nd Army, the command of which was taken over from Panin by Prince Dolgorukov - the capture of Crimea. The campaign of the 2nd Army was a complete success. Crimea was conquered without much difficulty. On the Danube, Rumyantsev’s actions were defensive in nature. P.A. Rumyantsev, a brilliant commander, one of the reformers of the Russian army, was a demanding, extremely brave, and very fair person.

The whole of 1772 passed in fruitless peace negotiations mediated by Austria.

In 1773, Rumyantsev's army was increased to 50 thousand. Catherine demanded decisive action. Rumyantsev believed that his forces were not enough to completely defeat the enemy and limited himself to demonstrating active actions by organizing a raid by Weisman’s group on Karasu and two searches for Suvorov on Turtukai. Suvorov had already gained the reputation of a brilliant military leader, who with small forces defeated large detachments of Polish Confederates. Having defeated Bim Pasha's thousand-strong detachment that crossed the Danube near the village of Oltenitsa, Suvorov himself crossed the river near the Turtukai fortress, having 700 infantry and cavalry men with two guns.

When the Russians captured Turtukai, Suvorov sent a laconic report on a piece of paper to the corps commander, Lieutenant General Saltykov: “Your Grace! We won. Glory to God, glory to you.”

At the beginning of 1774, Sultan Mustafa, an enemy of Russia, died. His heir, brother Abdul-Hamid, handed over control of the country to the Supreme Vizier Musun-Zade, who began correspondence with Rumyantsev. It was clear: Turkey needed peace. But Russia also needed peace, exhausted by a long war, military operations in Poland, a terrible plague that devastated Moscow, and finally, to the ever-flaming peasant uprisings in the east, Catherine granted Rumyantsev broad powers - complete freedom of offensive operations, the right to negotiate and conclude peace.

With the campaign of 1774, Rumyantsev decided to end the war. According to Rumyantsev's strategic plan that year, it was envisaged that military operations would be transferred beyond the Danube and an offensive to the Balkans in order to break the resistance of the Porte. To do this, Saltykov’s corps had to besiege the Rushchuk fortress, Rumyantsev himself with a detachment of twelve thousand had to besiege Silistria, and Repin had to ensure their actions, remaining on the left bank of the Danube. The army commander ordered M.F. Kamensky and A.V. Suvorov to attack Dobrudzha, Kozludzha and Shumla, diverting the troops of the Supreme Vizier until Rushchuk and Silistria fell. After fierce battles, the vizier requested a truce. Rumyantsev did not agree with the truce, telling the vizier that the conversation could only be about peace.

On July 10, 1774, peace was signed in the village of Kuchuk-Kainardzhi. The port ceded to Russia part of the coast with the fortresses of Kerch, Yenikal and Kinburn, as well as Kabarda and the lower interfluve of the Dnieper and Bug. The Crimean Khanate was declared independent. The Danube principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia received autonomy and came under the protection of Russia, Western Georgia was freed from tribute.

This was the largest and longest war waged by Russia during the reign of Catherine II. In this war, Russian military art was enriched by the experience of strategic interaction between the army and navy, as well as the practical experience of crossing large water obstacles (Bug, Dniester, Danube).

But the Russian-Turkish war of 1768 - 1774. turned out to be a failure for Turkey. Rumyantsev successfully blocked attempts by Turkish troops to penetrate deep into the country. The turning point in the war was 1770. Rumyantsev inflicted a number of defeats on the Turkish troops. Spiridonov's squadron made the first passage in history from the Baltic to the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea, to the rear of the Turkish fleet. The decisive Battle of Chesme led to the destruction of the entire Turkish fleet. And after the Dardanelles were blockaded, Turkish trade was disrupted. However, despite the excellent chances of developing success, Russia sought to conclude peace as quickly as possible. Catherine needed troops to suppress the peasant uprising. According to the Kuchuk-Kainardzhi Peace Treaty of 1774, Crimea gained independence from Turkey. Russia received Azov, Lesser Kabarda and some other territories.

According to the leading Russian historian V.O. Klyuchevsky, Russian policy towards Turkey in the era of Catherine II was especially clearly reflected by the lack of political eye, the inclination to look beyond immediate goals, without considering the available means. The foreign policy task inherited by Catherine was to advance the territory of the Russian state in the south to its natural limits, to the Black and Azov seas - and nothing more. But such a goal seemed too modest: the desert steppes, the Crimean Tatars - these are conquests that will not pay for the gunpowder spent on them. Voltaire jokingly wrote to Catherine II that her war with Turkey could easily end with the transformation of Constantinople into the capital of the Russian Empire. The epistolary courtesy coincided with serious matters in St. Petersburg and sounded like a prophecy.

Portrait of Catherine II. Artist F. Rokotov, 1763

And she developed amazing energy in herself, worked like a real chief of the general staff, went into the details of military preparations, drew up plans and instructions, hurried with all her might to build the Azov flotilla and frigates for the Black Sea, scoured all the corners and crannies of the Turkish Empire in search of, how to organize a stir, a conspiracy or an uprising against the Turks in Montenegro, Albania, among the Minots, in Kabarda, raised the kings of the Imeretian and Georgian and at every step encountered its own unpreparedness; Having decided to send a naval expedition to the shores of the Morea (Peloponnese), she asked her ambassador in London to send her a map of the Mediterranean Sea and the Archipelago, and also to get a cannon foundry that was more accurate than ours, “who cast a hundred guns, but only ten are good,” while busy raising Transcaucasia, she was perplexed, where Tiflis is located, on the Caspian or Black Sea coast, or inside the country.

The mood changed under changing impressions. “We will set a ringing tone that we did not expect,” wrote Catherine II soon after receiving news of the break with the Turks (November 1769). “We made a lot of porridge, it will be delicious for someone,” she wrote thoughtfully six months later, when the Turkish war flared up. But the rushing thoughts were dispersed by such dashing heads as the Orlov brothers, who only knew how to decide, and not to think.

At one of the first meetings of the council, which met on the affairs of the Turkish war of 1768-1774 under the chairmanship of the empress, Grigory Orlov, whom Catherine called Frederick II a hero, similar to the ancient Romans of the best times of the republic, proposed sending an expedition to the Mediterranean Sea. A little later, his brother Alexei, who was recovering his treatment in Italy, indicated the direct goal of the expedition: if we go, then go to Constantinople and free all Orthodox Christians from the heavy yoke, and drive their infidel Mohammedans, according to the word of Peter the Great, into the empty fields and steppes and sandy, to their former homes. He himself asked to be the leader of the uprising of Turkish Christians. It was necessary to have a lot of faith in providence in order to send a fleet for such a task, bypassing almost the entire Europe, which Catherine herself had recognized as worthless four years ago. And he hastened to justify the review. As soon as the squadron sailed from Kronstadt (July 1769) under the command Spiridova, entered the open sea, one ship of the latest construction turned out to be unfit for further navigation.

Russian-Turkish War 1768-1774. Map

The Russian ambassadors in Denmark and England, who inspected the passing squadron, were struck by the ignorance of the officers, the lack of good sailors, the many sick people, and the despondency of the entire crew. The squadron moved slowly towards the shores of Turkey. Catherine was losing her temper with impatience and asked Spiridov, for God’s sake, not to hesitate, to gather his spiritual strength and not to disgrace her in front of the whole world. Of the 15 large and small ships of the squadron, only eight reached the Mediterranean Sea. When A. Orlov examined them in Livorno, his hair stood on end and his heart bled: no provisions, no money, no doctors, no knowledgeable officers, and “if only all the services,” he reported to the empress, “were in such order and ignorance of how this sea one is, then our fatherland would be the poorest.” With an insignificant Russian detachment, Orlov quickly raised the Peloponnese, but could not give the rebels a lasting military structure and, having suffered a setback from the approaching Turkish army, abandoned the Greeks to their fate, irritated by the fact that he did not find Themistocles in them.

Catherine approved of all his actions. Having united with another squadron of Elfingston, which had meanwhile arrived, Orlov chased the Turkish fleet and in the Strait of Chios near the fortress of Chesme overtook an armada with a number of ships more than twice as strong as the Russian fleet. The daredevil was frightened when he saw “that structure,” but the horror of the situation inspired desperate courage, which was communicated to the entire crew, “to fall or destroy the enemy.” After a four-hour battle, when after the Russian “Eustathius” the Turkish admiral’s ship, which he set on fire, took off, the Turks took refuge in Chesme Bay (June 24, 1770). A day later, on a moonlit night, the Russians launched fire ships (incendiary ships), and by the morning the Turkish fleet crowded in the bay was burned (June 26).

Back in 1768, regarding the just-undertaken expedition to the Peloponnese, Catherine II wrote to one of her ambassadors: “If God pleases, you will see miracles.” And miracles had already begun, one thing was clear: in the Archipelago there was a fleet worse than the Russian one, and about this Russian fleet Orlov himself wrote from Livorno that “if we had not dealt with the Turks, we would have easily crushed everyone.” But Orlov failed to complete the campaign, break through the Dardanelles to Constantinople and return home by the Black Sea, as expected.

Amazing naval victories in the Archipelago in the Turkish War were followed by similar land victories in Bessarabia at Larga and Cahul (July 1770). Moldavia and Wallachia are occupied, Bendery is taken; in 1771 they captured the lower Danube from Zhurzhi and conquered the entire Crimea. It seemed that the territorial task of Russian policy in the south was resolved by Catherine II; Frederick II himself considered the annexation of Crimea to Russia a moderate condition for peace.

But St. Petersburg politics, too bold in its undertakings, was rather timid in calculating the results achieved. Fearing to alarm Europe with such large annexations as the Crimea and the Azov-Black Sea steppes, where the Nogai Tatars roamed between the Kuban and the Dniester, Catherine came up with a new combination - not to annex all these Tatars to Russia, but only to tear them away from Turkey and declare them independent, or rather, force them to exchange slight dependence on the sultan of the same faith for the patronage of the formidable queen of other faiths. The Nogai accepted the Russian proposal, but the Crimean Khan understood the sophisticated plan and bluntly called it idle talk and recklessness in his response to the Russian commissioner.

Crimea was conquered by the troops of Catherine II in 1771 precisely in order to impose Russian freedom on it. Among the Russian conditions for peace was the liberation of Moldavia and Wallachia, conquered by Russia, from Turkey, and Frederick II considered this matter possible. Now let's compare the end of the Turkish war of 1768-1774 with its beginning to see how little they converge. There were two liberations of Christians on different European outskirts of the Turkish Empire, Greeks in Morea, Romanians in Moldavia and Wallachia. They abandoned the first because they were unable to fulfill it, they were forced to abandon the second to please Austria and ended up with the third, freeing the Mohammedans from the Mohammedans, and the Tatars from the Turks, which they did not plan when they started the war, and which absolutely no one needed, not even themselves released. Crimea, which was occupied by Russian troops under Empress Anna and now re-conquered, was not worth even one war, but because of it they fought twice.

The basis of Russian victories in the second half of 18 century

DOI: 10.24411/2311-1763-2016-00007

Annotation. The article examines the main transformations in the Russian army in the second half of the 18th century and the military practical and theoretical activities of outstanding Russian commanders and military leaders, which became the foundation for the great victories of Russian weapons.

Keywords: Catherine II, P. A. Rumyantsev, G. A. Potemkin, A. V. Suvorov, Seven Years' War, Russian-Turkish War, Military Commission, General Staff.

Summary. The article reviews general transformations in the Russian Armed Forces during the second half of 18 century. Also, it reviews practical and academic activities of outstanding Russian commanders, who became a basis of Russian glorious victories.

Keywords: : Catherine the Great, P. A. Rumyantsev, G. A. Potemkin, A. V. Suvorov, The Seven Years’ War, Russo-Turkish War, Military Commission, the General Staff.

The second half of the 18th century in the history of Russia was marked by important military events that were closely related to the rapid foreign policy activity of the Russian autocracy. During numerous wars, the Russian army showed itself to be the strongest and most combat-ready army in Europe. One of the sources of the army’s combat power was the recruitment system introduced by Peter the Great, which until the 1790s was advanced compared to the recruitment system of Western European armies, which was based on the hiring and forced recruitment of soldiers.

A significant advantage of the recruitment system was that it provided Russia with the creation of a mass army. The country had an army that was larger than the armies of several leading European states combined.

The presence of such an army, as well as a strong navy, allowed the Russian government to pursue an active foreign policy, in which both imperial and national goals were closely intertwined. For almost half (21 years) of the second half of the 18th century, Russia was in a state of war. She waged long, large-scale wars (Seven Years' Wars 1756-1763, Russian-Turkish 1768-1774 and 1787-1790, campaigns of 1799), simultaneously or almost simultaneously with which smaller-scale wars were fought.

On June 27, 1762, Empress Catherine II ascended the throne, and from this day, one might say, the most brilliant, after Peter the Great, era in the history of Russian military art began; brilliant for two reasons: firstly, from the point of view of the development of Russian military art and its achievement of a high level, manifested in various branches of military affairs, and secondly, from the point of view of the results that were achieved through the intelligent application of military art in life, as they were: the solution to the Polish question and the enormous success in the fight against Turkey on the way to mastering the essential straits

Starting to ensure that “what can be decreed even better” in the army, Catherine first of all turns to the main outstanding participants in the Seven Years’ War and asks their opinions regarding the upcoming reforms, mainly regarding changes in the system and the main military-administrative laws of the Elizabethan era, caused by the experience of the said war. Following this, from the same persons at the end of 1762, according to the report of Field Marshal P.S. Saltykov, a commission was formed to discuss reforms in the military department according to an extensive program drawn up by the same field marshal and relating to all departments of military art.

To guide this commission, Catherine gave it instructions, which consisted of 33 points and which, while requiring certain improvements, indicated that the commission, in its work, should not shake the “old foundation,” that is, Peter’s ideas and principles.

Regarding the organization of troops, the commission of 1762 first of all expressed the main point, according to which it considered it more useful to have “a small army, but serviceable, than a large one on paper, but which is insufficient for many,” since, in the opinion of the commission, “the strength of the army does not consist in a lot of it, but from keeping it in discipline, from good teaching and fidelity.”

Summing up the organizational activities of the reign of Catherine II, it is necessary to note the following:

The total number of the army, out of necessity and not without effort, increases from 330 thousand to 500 thousand people, including garrison troops.
In the organization there are completely original examples that sharply distinguish our army from its contemporary European ones, such as:

a) development of rangers;
b) a significant increase in cavalry;
c) the development of a light type of cavalry primarily;
d) the adoption of an artillery organization, serving as a direct transition to a permanent organization in both peace and war;
e) strengthening of the settled troops, which took over the defense of the southern and eastern borders in return for the destroyed land militia;
f) a unique organization of garrison troops, fully consistent with their purpose and nature.

In general, the leaders of Catherine’s reign, without blindly obeying the models of Western Europe, preserving the principles bequeathed by Peter, sought to use the means that Russia could provide them. Hence the unique organization of the army, but coordinated with local and combat conditions.

Before the reign of Catherine II, the Russian army did not have a strong organization of large tactical units above a regiment. In 1764 and 1766 For this purpose, the military commission issued “instructions for the infantry and cavalry regiment to the colonel.” In its most comprehensive report dated November 17, 1764, the military commission says that the publication of such instructions is necessary “so that every colonel knows exactly what his most important position is.”

The organization of troops in wartime consisted in the fact that the troops that were part of the active armies were divided into parts, sometimes called indifferently divisions, sometimes corps of various compositions depending on the circumstances, and peacetime divisions did not retain their composition, territorial name and their commanders in peacetime time of the generals. Divisions were composed of brigades of the same type of troops. According to the regulations, each brigade was supposed to have two regiments, but in practice this was not always observed.

Regardless of these large military formations, a special light corps is found in all combat schedules as part of the active armies as a legacy of the Petrine organization, but in the era under review, the so-called corvolant acquires greater importance, both in its numbers and in the importance of the combat missions assigned to it. The war corvolant of the era in question represents a completely independent detachment of three branches of troops, operating ahead on the flanks of the army with the most decisive consequences.

Regarding the terms of service of the lower ranks, it should be noted that during this reign a 25-year service period was finally established as a general rule. Previously, it was difficult to establish such an order due to insurmountable obstacles to a completely secure life for retired soldiers who had lost contact with the population from which they were taken. For all newly recruited elements to serve military service, the service life was set to a shortened period of 15 years.

The military commission of 1762 drew attention to the unsatisfactory state of the quartermaster unit and proposed organizing it on a completely new basis and within a broader framework. At the same time, the commission even proposed changing the very name of the quartermaster unit, calling it the General Staff, which, according to the commission, should have been a separate institution, a single corps.

In 1763, according to the proposal of the Military Commission, a General Staff was formed with a strictly defined range of activities. At the same time, measures were also taken to externally unite the officers of the General Staff, for which, by the way, in 1764 they were given special uniforms and equipment. To direct the activities of the General Staff and its leadership, it was decided to have a special chief attached to the central military command. They decided to make the vice-president of the Military College such a leader.

The formed General Staff was entrusted with:

development in peacetime of data for the combat activities of troops,
training officers for the service of the General Staff in wartime, and
cartographic works.

Thus, the General Staff was charged with the responsibility of preparing for war in peacetime.

The composition of the officers of the General Staff was established in accordance with the needs of the three armies into which our troops were divided, and therefore was increased from 13 to 40. Most of these officers were with the armies, and the rest were with the Military Collegium, or rather, with its drafting room.

Since the Chief of the General Staff was the Vice-President of the Military Collegium, who at the same time was in charge of the secret expedition, the service of the General Staff officers was more and more connected with this expedition, which was in charge of all the secret orders for the movement of troops and for the collection of corps and detachments for operations.

However, despite some orderliness in the organization of the General Staff, in reality its officers were still alienated, as before, from a significant part of their direct responsibilities, especially in wartime. This happened because, essentially speaking, as before, there was no person who would organize special training for General Staff officers, define their duties and merge them with the troops, bringing the latter to an awareness of the importance of the service of the General Staff.

In the age of Catherine, many talented military people really appeared, among whom we should include Zakhar Chernyshev, Pyotr Panin, Prince N. Repnin, N. Saltykov, Zeisman, Ponyatovsky, Kretnikov, Kamensky, S. Vorontsov, Zavadovsky, M. Golenishchev-Kutuzov. But the field marshals especially stood out for their abilities and talents: P. A. Rumyantsev, G. A. Potemkin and A. V. Suvorov.

Each of the named field marshals had their own characteristics, which left an imprint on their activities, influencing in one way or another the Russian military art and placing the latter at such a high level.

Prince Grigory Alexandrovich Potemkin-Tavrichesky, who had been preparing for the clergy since childhood, was a sergeant in the horse guards when Catherine II ascended the throne. Soon, however, he stood out for his characteristics, first demonstrated as a combat officer in the first Turkish War, in which from 1769 to 1774 he rose from second captain to chief general and adjutant general. Appointed in 1774 as vice-president of the Military Collegium, Potemkin showed organizational and military-administrative talent, which showed itself even more widely when in 1784 he was made president of the Military Collegium. Potemkin's organizational and administrative activities constitute his main merit, placing him in the first ranks of military leaders of Catherine's reign and exerting an enormous influence in the most positive sense on the domestic military art of that time.

During the hostilities, his organizational talent came to the fore with even greater force and benefit. Distinguished by his enormous energy and efficiency, Potemkin quickly formed various parts with amazing skill, knowing how to find sources for recruitment. As for Potemkin’s military activity, it is much lower than his organizational and administrative activity, but, however, does not stand out from the average level in general, and it shows that Potemkin had sound judgments about military affairs and understood it well.

Count Pyotr Aleksandrovich Rumyantsev-Zadunaisky, the son of Petrovsky diplomat and Annensky general, received an excellent education at home, which he completed with a short stay in the Gentry Cadet Corps and a foreign campaign on the Rhine, and most importantly, with serious reading, which he never abandoned, even on campaigns. Rumyantsev's talent, perhaps, is not as bright and brilliant as Potemkin's, but it is much deeper and more multifaceted.

Rumyantsev's brilliant abilities were evident during the Seven Years' War, especially in the Kolberg operation of 1761. Already here he showed his talent as a commander and organizer. During the first Turkish war of 1769–1774. placed at the head of a significant army, he showed that he had a wide range of actions and understood the need to provide his subordinates, in the performance of the task given to them, with a sufficient share of freedom of action. During this war, Rumyantsev demonstrated strategic and tactical talent, which resulted in his brilliant victories over the Turks, which gave the war itself the name Rumyantsev, and Rumyantsev the name Transdanubia

Regardless of this, Rumyantsev worked fruitfully during this war on the development of combat education and training of troops, the establishment of reasonable discipline and the development of appropriate internal order in the troops. In general, Rumyantsev left either classical examples or guiding thoughts in almost all departments of Russian military art. They were summarized by him in brief provisions, convenient for understanding by all commanders, into “general rules of military art,” without touching on either “times” or “cases” of their application.

Among the figures of Catherine's era, Alexander Vasilyevich Suvorov stands taller than many, in terms of talent and importance for the Russian army.

Suvorov provided the greatest examples of strategy and tactics, acting against all kinds of opponents in various theaters of war under the most varied conditions; He was also not alien to organizational and military-administrative activities, in which he declared himself to be a remarkable talent. However, this is not mainly the greatness and significance of Suvorov. Both are based primarily on his military educational system, on his system of single training and combat training of entire units.

Delving into the essence of Suvorov's education, its means for developing the moral element in peacetime, stimulating it to the highest degree in battle, it is not difficult to notice that Suvorov, like no one else, achieved a great goal, primarily because he understood those reasons that long before Peter I have always challenged the Russian warrior to the highest selflessness. These reasons are devotion to the Faith, the Tsar, the Fatherland and irrevocably following in battle a superior who cared about him, who knew how to spare himself for the good of the cause, who knew how to set a personal example.

Possessing a brilliant mind, Suvorov learned that these moral foundations are the entire essence of success in combat, and sharply, like no one else, he brought forward everything that would contribute to the development of these moral principles - he originally educated himself in the same spirit and, most importantly, always, in features in battle, served the troops by personal example. This personal example had an irresistible effect on Suvorov’s soldiers in everything, and none of the most prominent figures of Catherine’s time, like Potemkin and Rumyantsev, had such an influence on the troops as Suvorov, and did not achieve similar results with those troops. They only directed the matter, but, compared with Suvorov, they were still far from the soldiers; Suvorov was one with them.

The military commission of 1762, in connection with the task assigned to it to distribute generals into “teams,” recognized the need to establish permanent large units in the army. As a result, according to the report of the Military College, in 1768 the army in peacetime was distributed into 8 divisions and 3 guard corps, and in accordance with this distribution it was located in permanent quarters.

In 1775, the number of divisions was increased to 11. The divisions represented a combination of all branches of the military and were not of the same composition, namely; from 8 to 20 battalions and from 10 to 50 squadrons. There were no intermediate units between individual units of troops and divisions. The Military Collegium, however, does not stop only at organizing divisions. In her report of 1768, she also points to the likely grouping of forces during a war on one front or another, that is, she makes the first attempt to distribute troops in peacetime to future active armies, and outlines three such armies.

These general considerations of the Military Collegium, dating back to 1768, received more complete development and completeness in the projects of Rumyantsev and Potemkin, developed by them, each separately, in the period between the first and second Turkish wars.

In theory, both projects are the same: both consider it necessary to distribute troops in peacetime into armies in accordance with the political situation: strength, composition, the ratio of various types of weapons, even the training of troops in one or another army should be subject to the properties and character of the potential enemy, the characteristics of that terrain theater in which the army is to operate. At the same time, ensuring appropriate training of troops and studying the enemy’s “turns” for each army was achieved by appointing a responsible person in peacetime - an inspector, who assumed the title of commander-in-chief with the declaration of war. In particular, however, both projects for the organization of the army are different, just as the starting considerations adopted by their drafters are different.

Rumyantsev recognized the need not to break the already established distribution of the army into divisions, its schedule for indispensable quarters. The central army he projected, the “reserve”, represented in his eyes a means for introducing amendments for the given political situation, allowing one or another of the other three advanced armies to be strengthened to the desired limits: “Pomeranian” - in the north, “Southern” - in the south and “Lower” - in the southeast.

Potemkin took as a basis the mutual position of the powers that had developed in 1785, when his project appeared. He links the distribution of troops among the three armies, their unique composition, their assignments and tasks to this changeable data.

Neither one nor the other project, however, was implemented. This was prevented by the outbreak of the second Turkish War, which attracted significantly larger forces to the southern border than Rumyantsev and Potemkin expected.

The formation of divisions undoubtedly had to influence the greater combat readiness of the army, its better and more uniform training, because all the most outstanding generals were appointed commanders of these divisions, attracted, contrary to previous customs, to the service and life of the troops in peacetime.

It must be said, however, that in peacetime the absence of higher combat formations, which are tactical units larger than a regiment, had the consequence that the strength and combat suitability of the army was determined mainly by the strength of, so to speak, elementary units, which were regiments . As a result of this, the foundations that were laid down in the management of the regiment acquire special significance.

In the age of Catherine, attention was paid not only to training, but also to the education of troops. Both Catherine herself and the outstanding figures of her era attached enormous importance to the education of the army, engaged in it and achieved brilliant results in this regard. We can say with confidence that only the combination of rational training with appropriate upbringing brought during the reign of Catherine II those amazing military results that history testifies to. And here there was an initiative from above, manifested in the “colonel’s instructions”, which restored some of the ideas and decrees of Peter the Great regarding education that had been forgotten in the army. This “colonel’s instruction,” by the way, states that it is necessary to “explain to the soldier the strength and content of the military article, regulations and orders, and even more so as for the soldier, explain the position of service and the undaunted courage required of the soldier and that no fears and difficulties courage and The loyalty of Russian soldiers could never be shaken, in which number and he was accepted.”

Further, the instructions stated that the soldiers should be taught that “a soldier in name and rank takes precedence over all his previous ranks.” Then the instructions, obliging regimental and company commanders to take care of the preparation of a good soldier, indicate the path to this, namely: moral education of the individual and discipline, the basis of which should be honor for rank, a conscious attitude to military duty and the development of moral motives, in the foreground of which is placed ambition. These ideas were put forward by Peter the Great and his personal example, and his laws.

The same ideas of the instruction were completely independently and independently put into practice by Rumyantsev, who also brought to the fore measures promoting the development of the moral element: “The highest development of military duty, strict but conscious discipline - not for fear only, but for conscience, affirming between the commander and subordinates mutual trust; direct work of officers to bring the lower ranks into a state decent for military people”; strict requirements of garrison and internal service.

A number of prominent figures come out of Rumyantsev’s school and spread his ideas. Vorontsov is one of these. His instructions to the company commander, in terms of the fidelity of educational ideas, breadth of vision, caring and sympathetic attitude towards the soldier, are reminiscent of the legal provisions of the second half of the 19th century.

Potemkin also began his service under the leadership of Rumyantsev; his work in the military educational field is distinguished by its demands. But Suvorov must be placed above everyone else in this regard. His educational system rested on the same foundations. Having spoken simultaneously with the release of the instructions and with the manifestation of Rumyantsev’s activity, Suvorov gradually developed the same great principles from the time he commanded the Suzdal regiment for 30 years, and in the end gradually created a whole complete system that took a certain form and direction. However, this system can be judged mainly only by the results achieved by its application.

It is completely impossible to restore exactly the consistent course of development and even the final forms of the system in their entirety, due to lack of material, but the essence of the Suvorov system, its principles can be restored.

Suvorov was a highly educated man, not only from a military, but also a general point of view, which he achieved through constant reading and the desire for self-improvement and self-education.

Possessing a broad education, Suvorov laid philosophical principles as the basis for educating the Russian soldier as a fighter: the properties of man in general, the properties of the Russian man in particular - his national characteristics - and the properties of the phenomena of war - mainly combat.

Based on the fact that a person has properties, some of which are very suitable for war (decisiveness, courage, contempt for danger, resourcefulness, willpower, good spirits, the ability to obey and command), and properties that are unsuitable for this purpose (a sense of self-preservation, inertia, lethargy, cowardice, indecisiveness), Suvorov aims to educate a soldier and sets out to develop the first and suppress the second. On the other hand, according to Suvorov, the main condition for military success is courage and determination in any case. But in order to be brave and decisive, you must not be afraid of danger, and the surest and most direct way for this is not to wait for it, but to meet it halfway. Suvorov strictly adhered to this. Hence his offensive tendencies, not only from the point of view of the most advantageous course of action, but also from the point of view of education.

In order for the offensive to be decisive, and only this leads to positive results, it is necessary, firstly, that nothing could puzzle the troops, that they be confident in their strength and not allow the thought that they could be beaten, and secondly, so that the offensive would certainly end with a blow. To achieve the first, Suvorov accustoms his troops to the unexpected. Hence his pursuit of unclear, evasive and indefinite answers to the most unexpected and sometimes ridiculous questions, appropriately conducted teachings and demands for a firm grasp of everything that a soldier needs to know.

As for the bayonet strike, it requires a strong will, which is developed through exercises in peacetime. Here the property of a Russian person comes to the aid of Suvorov, since the bayonet and the action with a bayonet are inherent in the characteristics of our nationality. But the development of offensive tendencies is hampered by the sense of self-preservation common to all people. To counteract him, Suvorov uses the characteristics of the Russian person, namely: his religiosity, his love and devotion to the Emperor, devotion to his homeland, pride in his nationality and ambition. Hence his constant call to prayer, appeal to God, constant reminders of Mother Tsarina, repetition of his favorite saying: “God have mercy, we are Russians” and his aphorism that “every soldier can be a general”...

Strict discipline; permanent activity; maintaining neatness and cleanliness as the surest guarantee of health; a dashing appearance as an outward manifestation of a soldier’s self-confidence complement the list of those principles on which Suvorov built his system of educating a soldier who, having gone through his school, did not know anything impossible either in the steppes and plains of the Kuban and Danube, or in front of the ramparts of Izmail and Prague, or on mountain heights of Switzerland.

To get a complete understanding of the combat training of troops in the era of Catherine, it is necessary to familiarize yourself with the battle formations of our army of that time and with its mode of action - with its tactics,

The most powerful factor that predominantly influenced the tactics of the Russian army in the second half of the 18th century was numerous wars. The direction that, under their influence, was adopted in this department of military art deviated too far from the principles outlined in the regulations, and from those combat techniques and battle orders that were common to all Western European armies at that time.

In general, the reign of Catherine II, from the point of view of the evolution of Russian military art, is an era in which ideas of deep tactics are gradually developed and in which these ideas are immediately put into practice. In this regard, this era can be characterized by one in which we have fully and correctly developed in practice the issues of training and educating troops based on the initiative and independence of commanding officers of all levels within the limits corresponding to their official position.

List of references and sources

Balitsky G. Coup of 1762. M., 1909.
Bestuzheva S. Catherine the Great. M., 2015.
Military history of the Russian state. 2nd ed. M., 2015.

Russian-Turkish War 1768-1774 (briefly)

In the winter of 1768-1769, the Russian-Turkish War begins. Russian troops under the command of Golitsyn cross the Dniester and capture the Khotin fortress, entering Iasi. As a result, all of Moldova takes an oath to Catherine II.

At the same time, the new empress, together with her favorites, the Orlov brothers, built rather daring plans, hoping to expel all Muslims from the Balkan Peninsula. To accomplish this, the Orlovs propose to send agents and raise Balkan Christians to revolt against the Muslims, and then send Russian squadrons to support the Aegean Sea.

In the summer, the flotillas of Elphinston and Spiridov sailed to the Mediterranean from Kronstadt, which, upon arriving at the site, were able to incite a rebellion. But he was suppressed faster than Catherine II expected. At the same time, the Russian generals managed to win a stunning victory at sea. They drove the enemy into Chesme Bay and completely defeated them. By the end of 1770, the squadron of the Russian Empire captured about twenty islands.

Operating on land, Rumyantsev's army managed to defeat the Turks in the battles of Cahul and Largi. These victories gave Russia all of Wallachia and there were no Turkish troops left in the north of the Danube.

In 1771, V. Dolgoruky’s troops occupied the entire Crimea, placed garrisons in its main fortresses and placed Sahib-Girey on the khan’s throne, who swore allegiance to the Russian empress. The squadrons of Spiridov and Orlov made long raids to Egypt and the successes of the Russian army were so impressive that Catherine wanted to annex Crimea as quickly as possible and ensure independence from the Muslims of Wallachia and Moldova.

However, such a plan was opposed by the Western European Franco-Austrian bloc, and Frederick the Second the Great, who was a formal ally of Russia, behaved treacherously, putting forward a project according to which Catherine had to give up a large territory in the south, receiving Polish lands as compensation. The Empress accepted the condition, and this plan was implemented in the form of the so-called Partition of Poland in 1772.

At the same time, the Ottoman Sultan wanted to get out of the Russian-Turkish war without losses and in every possible way refused to recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its independence. After unsuccessful peace negotiations, the Empress orders Rumyantsev to invade with an army beyond the Danube. But it didn’t bring anything outstanding.

And already in 1774 A.V. Suvorov managed to defeat the forty-thousand-strong Turkish army at Kozludzha, after which the Kaynardzhi Peace was signed.